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ABSTRACT
Plato’s Gorgias: Rhetoric, the Greatest Evil, and
the True Art of Politics
by
Paul A. George
Dr. Mark Lutz, Examination Committee Chair
Assistant Professor of Political Science
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
The interweaving of rhetoric, the greatest evil, and the true art of politics create
the unity of the dialogue. Whereas Gorgianic rhetoric is pleasure seeking flattery which
inspires belief without knowledge, noble rhetoric is refutative, inspiring the
acknowledgment of falsity or ignorance. Moreover, it is self-refutation, meaning that the
person being persuaded arrives at the conclusion of his ignorance by his own realization;
the noble rhetor does not connect all the dots for them. The greatest evil is to have a false
opinion about justice. A just penalty for suffering from the greatest evil is to face selfrefutation in hopes that this will inspire a desire to seek true knowledge through
philosophical inquiry. The true art of politics is a personal, individual art, coordinating
justice and legislation. Justice teaches what the best care for the soul is and legislation
regulates behavior to conform action with the demands of justice, being guided by selfdiscipline and moderation. Each participant in the dialogue suffers to a degree from the
greatest evil, which Socrates addresses by conversing rhetorically with them to arouse an
understanding of what rhetoric is, what their false opinions are, and how that relates to
living the best life.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Plato’s Gorgias has a strange magic to it. The dialogue is named after the famed
rhetorician from Sicily, Gorgias of Leontini, who claimed to possess a kind of “verbal
magic”: the art of rhetoric. This he described as “the incantatory power which by its
witchery enchants, persuades, and changes the souls of men” (Dodds 1959, 8). That the
Gorgias is concerned with this “magical” art is clear when early on Socrates states his
intention to meet the rhetor in order to “learn from him what the power of his art is, and
what it is that he professes and teaches” (447c). The discussion that follows, however,
deals with more than just rhetoric. It probes into a plentitude of subjects including
justice, punishment, pleasure, politics, and philosophy, often causing this original topic to
be overshadowed.

The dialogue delves into the depths of the souls of the discussants,

challenging them on their beliefs, desires, and ways of life.
But the direction of the dialogue does not produce a parallel change in all the
souls of the participants, nor in those of its readers. Where the dialogue proves
persuasive for some, it is problematic for others. While some of the commentators point
to the power of Plato to “attract and enchant” those looking for “a richer and truer
account of human life,” others see mostly “dark and gloom that awaits” (Stauffer 2006, 1;
Arieti 1991, 79). What is to account for the discrepancy between these descriptions?
Answers to this question are varied and widespread, but are centered on the
unique characteristics of the dialogue, such as its tone. In comparison to the rest of
Plato’s works the Gorgias arouses a unique bitterness, both from the philosopher and his

1

participants. This bitterness is often seen as an indictment of rhetoric and democracy.
Kennedy, ascribing the bitterness in the work to the death of Socrates, claims that Plato
“is so prejudiced that he weights the scales against rhetoric” (1964, 15). Hunt, blaming
Plato’s dislike of Athenian politics, describes the apparent harsh treatment of rhetoric as a
“broadly satirical caricature…(of) false pretense to knowledge, overweening conceit,
fallacious argument…and, in general, a ready substitution of appearance for reality”
(1925, 20).
This view of Plato, however, is shortsighted. The existence of things like logical
flaws, historical liberties, and excessive bitterness might show something akin to motive
to lambast rhetoric or democracy, but the evidence for intent is lacking. Rather, the
author’s intent can be found by turning to the most overlooked aspect of the dialogue: the
drama.
The dialogue format is not a treatise. It is not meant to be a systematic, scientific
analysis attempting to uncover and exhaust all aspects of a topic. It is a conversation
between individuals meant more to bring out what those individuals think, feel, and
understand. As a conversation, a dialogue involves action, or in other words, it involves
drama. The emphasis, the tone, the body language, and everything else that fills out a
thought and completes what is being said are crucial parts of the work but have to be
understood without explicit direction, as there is none given by the author. Those in
Plato’s day might have relied on their own knowledge of the historical characters to fill in
these dramatic blanks, but we can still be assured today that someone who “curried and
combed the locks of his dialogues to the end of his days” has left enough indirect cueing
to bring us to his desired understanding of the work (Black 1958, 361). A careful reading
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will show there exists a depth, eloquence, and respect given by Plato to the characters
that breathes truth. It is thus becoming of the reader to give scrutinization to the work on
par with the care put into it, which includes acknowledging that apparent fallacies were
also apparent to the author and perhaps purposely so.
Ultimately, the intent of all of Plato’s dialogues is to show us the life of Socrates
and bring us to a life of philosophy. Often the most important part of such a philosophic
education is to understand the obstacles in that path. As Bruell notes, “the most
important obstacles, which stem from the intrinsic difficulty of the problems treated by
Plato, would have been encountered by readers of any period, including Plato’s own; and
we can assume that he has supplied in the dialogues themselves the most suitable
assistance for overcoming them” (1995, 96). The problems of the dialogue thus prove to
demonstrate the internal inconsistencies of the dialogue’s participants, perhaps the same
ones that are in us as well. In turn, the dialogues are not meant to prove beyond a shadow
of a doubt the tenets it supports, but to show how characters themselves stand in relation
to that tenet. The argumentation is meant to draw them to reflect inwardly about their
own opinions. Attention to the drama of the dialogue brings out this understanding.
Often Plato will use another character to point out the inconsistencies or faulty
logic used elsewhere as another sign of the time and care put into the dialogues, showing
the ultimate end of the work is a philosophical inquiry. Moreover, it is a careful reader
that will notice the inconsistencies that go unmentioned by others in the dialogue and to
question those. It is in this way that the inner reflection the dialogue prompts in the
participants serves as a signal to the reader to ponder the same points. This is the magic
of the Gorgias; this is how the dialogue works its witchery.
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The question to ask is what problems, points, or obstacles to philosophy does the
Gorgias wish its readers to ponder? The subject of rhetoric has to be at least one of them.
The dialogue begins as an inquiry into rhetoric with the father of the art. In the
subsequent jumble of interruptions that follows, the topic of rhetoric seems to be
swallowed up by a number of different subjects. But toward the end of the dialogue the
topic again takes the forefront, though with new treatment. Whereas in the beginning it
merited a harsh critique as a base thing that promotes pleasure, in the end it reveals noble
potential (503a).
The notion of a noble rhetoric, in fact, has seeds planted throughout the dialogue,
even before the art receives its acrid assailment, and what these seeds point toward is
possibly an alliance between rhetoric and dialectic. Dialectic is a type of conversation,
but is more of an inquiry, within a small group. Views are presented, refutations then
offered, and a common ground is arrived at, upon which the process begins again. The
process is able to proceed because the goal is truth, not victory over the other participant.
But as Vlastos points out, Socrates typically has two ends for his dialectical debates:
“how every human ought to live and to test the single human being that is doing the
answering” (1983, 115). It is this latter aspect that often ignites anger from the
participants. Additionally, the argument rarely ends with the discovery of truth, but
instead produces aporia. Rather than being brought to know something, the participants
are more often left to realize that they do not know. This awakening of ignorance also
results in anger.
How might rhetoric be used to supplement dialectic? For dialectic to work, two
characteristics, derived from the description above, are needed: a desire to search for the
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truth and openness to recognize ignorance. Rhetoric may be able to fill in these gaps.
Rhetoric may be the supplement needed to persuade those otherwise closed off to
philosophy to partake. Rhetoric is like medication, indeed, a bitter pill, to cure the
sickness of confusion, apathy, dislike, or hatred toward philosophy.
Although Gorgias plays only a small part as the direct speaker in the dialogue, the
whole work is really a conversation with the rhetor. Gorgias does not remain silent after
his beginning section ends, but he intercedes at crucial parts of the dialogue to keep it
from breaking up. Moreover, his interjections show that he is sincere and interested in
what Socrates has to say, as if he is beginning to understand what an alliance between the
two could mean. Perhaps Socrates has some hope of a Gorgianic style of rhetoric that
could reach the masses and the closed off in ways he couldn’t to turn them toward
philosophy.
While this fits the character, content, and drama of the dialogue, I feel there is still
a greater lesson to learn. The dialogue is not only a conversation between the characters,
but also literature, and thus a conversation between the author and the reader. Plato’s
intent would then not be to make sure the reader has a proper understanding of the
relationship between rhetoric and dialectic simply, but to bring him to philosophy. In that
sense, the dialogue acts as a piece of rhetoric itself, perhaps turning into propaganda for
the Academy (Nichols 1995). Also, the question of what obstacles kept the others in the
dialogue from becoming philosophical has not been answered. The greater lesson from
the dialogue is a deeper understanding of the specific obstacles faced by the participants.
In some way or other, Socrates accuses each of the discussants of not being in
agreement with themselves. Upon the notice of the first such inconsistency in the
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dialogue, Socrates takes his time to explain that his purpose is not to refute in order to
achieve verbal victory but to find the truth (457d-458b). He then emphasizes this by
stating that he believes “that nothing is so great an evil for a human being as a false
opinion about the things that our argument now happens to be about”. The subject matter
then before them happens to be the power of rhetoric, or more particularly, the just use of
that power. Socrates’s reference to the greatest evil for a human being is more than
simply a false opinion about the just use of rhetoric, but a false opinion about the nature
of justice.
The tyrannical talk of the rest of the dialogue overshadows discussion of the
greatest evil as having a false opinion. Later on Socrates will repeat the label of the
greatest evil but ascribe it to unjust acts instead of false opinions about justice (469d,
479d). To differentiate between having wrong beliefs about justice and committing
unjust acts may seem an unnecessary differentiation, but the drama of the dialogue
reveals that, at least for the three participants, having the false opinion is the greater
harm. Hobbes seemed to recognize this distinction and word it accurately when he wrote,
"The actions of men proceed from their opinions; and in the well-governing of opinions,
consisteth the well-governing of men's actions, in order to their peace and concord"
(Hobbes 1996, 118). While the participants, as well as many today, would insert the
word "interests,” or perhaps "passions,” where "opinions" appears, Hobbes's position is
clear: opinions are the primary factor behind action, and the root of the greatest evil
(Grant 2002).
To be under the persuasion of false opinions, particularly false opinions about
justice, is the obstacle to a philosophic life that Plato presents in the Gorgias. Each
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speaker presents the obstacle in a unique way, to which Socrates responds accordingly.
The adherence that they give to their false opinions, the extent to which they hold to these
tenets, keeps them from arguing dialectically. This causes Socrates to speak rhetorically
throughout the dialogue, which accounts for faulty arguments and bitter tone. Were they
able to participate in a dialectical conversation then this dialogue would look more like
the Republic and delve into the nature of justice. In fact, just as the Gorgias begins to
touch upon the nature of justice the direction of the discussion swings away in order to
face these dialectical obstacles first. What the dialogue reveals as these obstacles are
uncovered is not only an understanding of how to begin to pursue a philosophic life, but
also important implications for leadership, education, and politics as a whole.
The next three chapters that follow will be devoted to each of the participants
from the dialogue. The arguments will be analyzed, with special attention paid to the
drama, to understand the obstacle before the participant, his false opinion of justice, and
what Plato is trying to suggest about it. Concluding the paper will be a summary of the
arguments and a possible suggestion for their application today. The primary edition of
the Gorgias used for this work is Nichols’s translation (1998). All quotations to the text,
unless otherwise noted, are his translation.

7

CHAPTER 2
GORGIAS
Gorgias was from the Greek colony of Leontini, of the island of Sicily. He lived
roughly from 485- 380 BCE. Most of what remains of his past is largely that of rumor
and anecdote with few firm facts to rely upon. The surviving, reliable sources attest to
the effectiveness and persuasiveness of Gorgias’s rhetoric, showing “that he was widely
admired, that his popularity never waned during his life, and that he was wealthy and
famous beyond all the other sophists” (Connors 1986, 46). The rhetor spent his days
travelling through Greece, unwed and childless, teaching his craft. He is said to have
taught Isocrates and Pericles and to have had an influence upon Thucydides; additionally,
his ideas were predecessors for such modern-day thinkers as Heidegger, Derrida, and
Rorty (Consigny 2001, 2).
What was it about this speaker, whose use of rhetoric “set the tone for the last
thirty years of the fifth century,” that made him so attractive (Jaeger 1943, 127)? His
novelty in style set him apart, which included both a new sense of structure and
ornamentation. His work was innovatively poetic, using such literary devices as
antithesis, anadiplosis (repetition of words), homoeoteleuton (similarity in ending
syllables) and parisosis (arrangement of words in nearly equal periods) (Consigny 1992,
43). For Gorgias, logos with meter is poetry and logos without meter is rhetoric (a
comment that does not go unnoticed by Plato in his dialogue) (McComisky 2002, 30).
While his stylistic beauty won him praise, it also spurred heavy criticism. The most
forceful criticism comes from Aristotle, who calls his work “derivative,” “frigid,” and
“overly theatrical,” which held as the prevailing attitude toward the rhetor until recent
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times when both Hegel and Grote began their attempt to “rehabilitate” the sophists
(Consigny 2001, 69).
Their “rehabilitation” brought about an emphasis on the substance of his work,
which is the other attractive aspect that brought Gorgias recognition in his day. His
novelty in content set him apart, particularly his use of paradoxologia, earning him the
title of the father of the sophists. While critics find his examples of paradox artistic but
empty, others see in them a “practical validity” that points toward a certain epistemology,
guided by a principle of kairos (McComisky 2002, 18). This principle of an “opportune
moment” creates a relativistic conception of truth, requiring a “continuous adjustment to
and creation of the present occasion,” of which logos interprets (White 1987, 15). This is
seen in his work Encomium of Helen where the rhetor states:
If all people on all subjects had memory of things past and comprehension of
things present and prescience of things to come, then language [logos] would not
function as it does [that is, as an imprecise medium]’ however, the way things are,
it is difficult to remember the past and perceive the present and foretell the future,
so that most people regarding most subjects accept opinion as advisor to their
soul. (Van Hook, 1993, 123)
Still, a reliance on the principle of kairos may be too little to rest a full philosophy
upon. With an insufficient amount of the rhetor’s work is extant, Consigny decided to
compare what remains with other works within their relative genre rather than compare
Gorgias’s works side by side. What emerged, rather than a “theoretical consistency, “is a
chameleon like Gorgias, able to shift, change, and adapt to relative audiences” (Consigny
1992, 46). While this imitative aspect may reinforce the idea of a relativistic
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epistemology, there are several other aspects of his writings that cast a shadow on
Gorgias having a firm philosophical stance. The concluding line of the Helen reads, “I
wished to write a speech which would be a praise of Helen and a diversion to myself
“(Van Hook 1993, 123, emphasis added)
There are many unanswered questions about Gorgias, prominent among them is
whether he is serious or joking. His most paradoxical work, On What Is Not, is
considered by many to be a parody of Parmenides’s work On What Is. Others believe
that the other remaining works are models for instructing pupils (Poulakos 1983, 3). The
last line of the Helen certainly raises questions about his true intent. While these
unanswered points are important to ponder, another more pertinent question about the
rhetor remains: why was Plato interested in him?
The thesis of this paper is that the greatest evil to afflict a human being is to have
a false opinion about justice. The conversation with Gorgias, which forms only a short
part of the whole dialogue, is quickly steered toward the topic of justice. Some argue that
the historical Gorgias would never have conceded to the premises of rhetoric and justice
in the dialogue thereby making the arguments invalid (McComisky 2002, 31). But
whether Plato was completely true to the historical character or not is largely beside the
point. What proponents of the historical Gorgias cannot dismiss is the rhetor’s claim to
not teach virtue, an aspect of his character that set him apart from the rest of the sophists,
and the aspect that in all likelihood is the impetus for Plato’s interest (Harrison 1964,
188).
So how does his denial of teaching virtue relate to a false opinion about justice?
To understand this there must first be mention of how the term was used in fifth-century
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Greece. Irwin, in his commentary on the dialogue, gives a good understanding of the
term:
Arētē, normally translated by virtue or excellence, refers quite generally to
whatever properties make a thing good, agathon, at something or for some
purpose…Gorgias denies that he teaches virtue because, unlike Protagoras, he
does not claim to teach the recognized virtues which will make someone an allround good citizen. But he can claim to teach a virtue, since he claims that the
power gained by being a rhetor is a good for the rhetor himself. (1979, 122)
Harrison agrees with Irwin’s conclusion and is quick to dismiss Gorgias’s denial of
teaching virtue as “lacking any real substance” (1964, 189). In his opening lines in the
dialogue, Gorgias not only declares that he is a rhetor, but “a good one, if you wish to call
me what I boast I am” (449a). This is followed by his assertion that he is able to make
other men rhetors as well. Surely these claims together are not a promise to make his
pupils bad at rhetoric; his promise is to make them able men of the art, to give them
“freedom for human beings themselves and at the same time rule over others in each
man’s city” (452d). Clearly he teaches virtue as ability.
But Irwin defined Gorgias’s denial to teach virtue as a denial to make his pupils
good citizens. This sets Gorgias apart from the other sophists found throughout the
Platonic corpus. In fact, Plato is consistent in giving Gorgias preferential treatment in the
dialogues over other sophists. The conversation between Socrates and Gorgias is not a
sarcastic, humoristic one like in the Hippias Major, nor is it a quasi-competition as in the
Protagoras, but it is a cautious discussion that does more to pique the rhetor’s intrigue
rather than anger or humiliate him. His role as a money-maker for selling his craft earns
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him a spot with others sophists elsewhere in the dialogues (Apology 19d, Hippias Major
282B). But more remarkable is his absence from the gathering of sophists in the
Protagoras and his own self labeling as “rhetor” rather than sophist in this dialogue (Pro.
314e-316b, Gor. 449a). There is an important difference between Gorgias and the rest
that Plato wants discerned.
What the sophists meant by teaching virtue, as seen in the Protagoras, is a very
similar to the education just outlined by Gorgias: a promise of “success in political debate
and action” (319a). Socrates sums up this education as “art of citizenry” (319a).
Gorgias, on the other hand, seeks only to define his art in terms of persuasion (453a,
454b, 455a). This persuasion focuses on political aspects (being in a law court, gaining
rule over others, etc.) but Gorgias never calls it an art of politics or citizenry. First and
foremost it is an art of persuasion.
What does this show about Gorgias’s opinion about the art? Perhaps it shows a
deeper care, or a greater passion, than what the other sophists have. While both his initial
claim to be a good rhetor and his finale in the Helen might be seen as arrogance they can
also be a demonstration of his care for the craft. He takes it seriously, while enjoying it
immensely. Neither is he when he states that his art is the best and greatest, nor is he
simply pandering to potential pupils; he truly believes there is a greatness in the art that
surpasses all others. He does what he does because he cannot help himself, which
relegates money-making to a secondary concern. It is hard to say where money-making
ranks for the sophists in the other dialogues. A greater care for the art (perhaps a greater
eros) and less care for money-making account for Plato’s preferential treatment of
Gorgias.
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How does this relate to Gorgias’s denial to teach virtue? It is because his main
goal is not educating but practicing his art, perhaps something not too uncommon with
some professors in academia today who are more interested in research than in shaping
young minds. So the important thing to understand about his denial of teaching virtue is
realizing he has little care for it. The relativistic nature of logos makes an idea of virtue,
or good citizenry, superfluous or irrelevant. He can be considered agnostic on the
question of virtue, which allows him to define his art as amoral.
Plato, on the other hand, understands virtue in the morally laden sense that is
more typical of its use today. This is crucial to understanding the thesis of the dialogue.
Plato believes that despite Greek culture’s understanding of virtue as good by effective
use, there is an inner understanding in all of us that concurs with understanding virtue as
good for the soul. McKim calls this the “Socratic Axiom,” which states: “for Socrates,
virtue is always supremely beneficial to the moral agent himself as well as to those
toward whom he acts virtuously, whereas vice, in addition to the material harm it inflicts
on others, is always supremely harmful to the agent, being bad for the health of his soul”
(1988, 35). Part of Socrates’s intent in questioning Gorgias is to bring him to realize that
he too believes this axiom, and that his ambivalence toward virtue is itself unjust.
Following the drama of the dialogue closely will show the rhetor’s stance toward
virtue, which will be revealed by uncovering Gorgias’s false opinions about justice. To
do this Socrates will have to question the rhetor in his usual way, which requires putting
aside Gorgias’s show rhetoric and following a course of conversation instead (447c).
Gorgias, having just made an offer to answer any question posed to him, gladly agrees to
answer Socrates, expecting it to be a demonstration of his skill (449c).
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The first question posed asks for a definition of rhetoric which does not come
easily. In compliance with Socrates’s request to give brief answers, Gorgias first
concludes that rhetoric is about speeches (449e). But this is too vague; medicine,
arithmetic, and even gymnastic all require speech. What are rhetorical speeches about
that makes them different? Still not getting to the point, Gorgias tries to differentiate
between arts that use manual skill and those that do not. Rhetoric produces its “whole
action and decisive effect” without manual input (450c). After a third request for
clarification, the rhetor draws the conclusion that rhetoric is speeches about “the greatest
of human affairs, and the best” (451d). But does not the doctor claim health is the best
thing for humans, and the trainer claims beauty is, and the moneymaker wealth?
With a little more prodding Gorgias arrives at almost a clear answer: rhetoric,
with its decisive effect through speech, causes “freedom for human beings…and rule
over others in each man’s own city” which includes persuading judges, assemblymen,
councilors, and any type of man in every “political gathering” (452d-453a). Socrates
sums this up succinctly: rhetoric is the craftsman of persuasion. Gorgias is happy with
this answer; what makes this answer pleasing to him is that persuasion is the “chief
point” (453a). Through speech, Gorgias has been able to persuade the politically
powerful, which he did in 427 BCE as an ambassador sent to Athens to ask for assistance
against Syracuse. He has also been able to persuade many into becoming his pupils by
having them believe he has value to impart to them. But perhaps most important, he has
been able to persuade himself that his art is good and valuable.
Socrates takes an approach that addresses these three areas: persuading the
politically powerful, the potential pupil, and one’s self. Working in reverse order, the
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philosopher gives an example of how he persuades himself. Self-persuasion, as the
dialogue will show, is ultimately what rhetoric, or better stated noble rhetoric, is about.
This first inkling toward a noble purpose or use for rhetoric will grow from this quiet
interjection to a harsh refutation by the end of the dialogue, culminating in a new outlook
for politics and philosophy.
Socrates’s own use of self-persuasion is to ascertain the bottom-line truth of any
argument (453b). This shows Socrates’s openness to discussion and his desire to know,
placing knowledge higher than verbal victory on a hierarchy of importance. What
matters is the truth that comes from the argument. This is in contrast to Gorgias’s use of
self-persuasion, which had been to instill a deep care for rhetoric above anything else,
including justice. What matters to him is the ability to craft the argument in any way
desired through logos.
This mention of self-persuasion is preparation for a refutation of Gorgias’s false
opinion on justice. While dialectic was Plato's general scientific method, rhetoric is a
special psychological application of it (Black 1958, 369). Noble rhetoric’s purpose is
refutation, primarily to refute or persuade ourselves against our own false opinions.
Socrates takes extra care at this point to show his sincerity toward the argument, not
toward verbal victory. This is the first of many coddlings that Socrates will offer the
rhetor to ensure Gorgias does not become personally offended and therefore sticks with
the argument. As will be seen, these codlings will work, for, unlike the other participants
in the dialogue, Gorgias will remain an active, though mostly silent, participant.
Next Socrates has Gorgias focus on his ability to persuade potential pupils by
asking whether any other art persuades. Socrates gives teaching as an example and
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Gorgias replies in the affirmative, acknowledging that instructive arts also persuade
(453d). Just as other arts also use speeches, clarification is sought here by asking about
what is rhetoric persuasive? The answer reveals an unforeseen, or better yet, neglected
aspect of Gorgias’s role as a teacher. The rhetor replies that it is persuasion in the law
courts, “about the just and the unjust” (454b).
This is an important turn in the drama. Just raised is an issue that connects virtue
and rhetoric, so how can Gorgias claim not to teach virtue when his whole art revolves
around a part of virtue, being the just and the unjust? This admission that rhetoric is
about the just and unjust may not be a completely sincere answer. Levett believes this
simply refers “to a common-sense, general knowledge of laws, customs, values and even
the procedures that pertain in such circumstances” (2005, 212). This is an emphasis on
place rather than value. Nichols notes that it is more an advertisement to the potential
students listening by forcing Gorgias to leave behind a universal art of persuasiveness
and instead focus on the rhetorical area most in demand, “politics in general and judicial
proceedings in particular” (1998, 132-133). Alternatively, Kahn offers that in, order to
protect himself from expulsion from the city, Gorgias, a foreigner to Athens, has to keep
hidden both his ambivalence toward virtue and the unjust nature of rhetoric to avoid
“suspicion and hostility” from the families of the youth that surround him (1983, 80-81).
Socrates, however, is concerned with having Gorgias come face to face with his
false opinion about justice. This point, though, is not yet apparent to Gorgias. It not
likely that Gorgias is thinking of virtue in the same manner as Socrates, nor is it likely
that Gorgias is connecting virtue to justice at this point. To ensure that Gorgias does not
begin to think Socrates is trying to corner him into harm or embarrassment, Socrates
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offers another coddling, again confirming the conclusion of the argument as the most
important thing (454b-c).
The focus is now on the third example of rhetorical persuasion, the politically
powerful. Socrates eases into addressing the political aspect by first focusing on
persuasion. Two types exist, that which teaches and that which inspires belief. When
asked which type of persuasion rhetoric engenders Gorgias answers, “it’s clear, I suppose
Socrates, that it’s the one from which believing comes” (454e). If the answer is clear,
why does Gorgias add “I suppose,” thereby adding a touch of hesitation to his response?
It is because he can see where this admission can lead and he is beginning to wonder
whether Socrates is true to his consoling sidebars to put the argument over verbal victory.
From this concession Socrates clarifies a new definition of rhetoric, stating it as “a
craftsman of belief-inspiring but not didactic persuasion about the just and the unjust”
(455a).
Now comes the focus on the persuasion of the political. Rhetoric is not didactic
in the law courts due to two difficulties: a lack of time and the size of the audience. Both
Nichols and Irwin see this as a sizeable attack on rhetoric, suggesting that the nondidactic nature shows a lack of concern with or a lack of knowledge about justice (1998,
37; 1979, 119). On the other hand, Stauffer sees no attack on rhetoric here, but counts
this remark simply as an admission of the reality of political discourse and the necessity
to speak both to the many and with little time, meaning that “the most effective political
speech must include appeals to mere opinions and beliefs, having the necessary strength
of instilling those very opinions or beliefs” (2006, 28). Whether this is an attack or a
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support, the next statement will be a golden invitation for Gorgias to extol the good of
rhetoric.
Suppose there is a situation where the city is in need of counsel, such as a
pressing need to construct a dockyard. Socrates suggests that the city will seek counsel
from “the most artful,” which in the case of the dockyard construction would be the
architect, not a rhetor (455b). Prompting the opinion of Gorgias, the question is posed in
chorus with the voices the potential students in attendance, “What will be ours Gorgias, if
we associate with you? About what things will we be able to give counsel to the city?”
(455d).
Gorgias is a clever man. He recognizes that Socrates has shied away from turning
negative toward rhetoric, stating that the philosopher has “paved the way beautifully”
(455e). He has been given an opportunity to present his art in the best light possible.
Perhaps this makes the rhetor believe that Socrates is really concerned with the argument
itself. It is not the craftsman who guides the city, but the rhetors, such as Pericles and
Themistocles. This is the power of the rhetor, to victoriously give counsel and have their
resolutions win over the craftsmen (456a).
Even as Socrates posed the question he already knew the answer. Themistocles’s
accomplishments of constructing the Athenian navy were well known and Socrates
personally heard Pericles counsel for the construction of the middle wall. Neither of the
two was a craftsman for that which he counseled (455e). This was a essentially a free
throw for Gorgias. This was a concession of the debate principle of charity: allowing the
opponent the best position to defend their side. This charity will be built upon and
provide another free throw for Gorgias. Socrates wonders at the power of rhetoric,
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calling it “demonic in greatness,” which prompts Gorgias to deliver his longest speech in
the dialogue as a praise of rhetoric.
The power of rhetoric is to gather under itself all things, making it more
persuasive than any craftsman (456c). Gorgias then relays an anecdote of an experience
with his brother, Herodicus the physician. The craftsman of health was unable to
persuade a patient to submit to a treatment, but Gorgias, using only the power of rhetoric,
was able to do so. The power of rhetoric is power: the ability through persuasion to make
others do, think, and believe anything. Gorgias has finally answered the first part of
Socrates’s initial inquiry.
But then Gorgias takes a confusing turn; he begins a defense of rhetoric. Why
offer a defense? Was an accusation given? Gorgias claims that, like any other
competitive art, the trainer should not be blamed for the misuse of the art; just as a boxing
trainer should not be blamed for a student who beats his parents, the rhetor should not be
blamed for the unjust use of rhetoric. Dodds suggests that this may have been an
illustration from the historical Gorgias himself (1959, 212). Rhetoric’s tendency toward
injustice has been the anticipated point in the dialogue ever since Gorgias defined
rhetoric as being about the just and unjust; however, it was anticipated that Socrates make
this point instead of the rhetor.
But still, why offer a defense? Why not continue to praise the power of rhetoric
and give more examples of how it is good? Would not this do more to both please the
crowd and answer Socrates’s inquiry? There are two possible answers. First, it is
possible that Gorgias realizes that the good examples of rhetoric do not show the
preeminence of the art but demonstrate its subservience to another art, such as how
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rhetoric served medicine. Rhetoric did not diagnose the medical problem, and persuading
the patient to submit to the treatment does nothing to elevate rhetoric over medicine. If
the patient is cured it is the doctor, not the rhetor, who will be praised. Additionally, it is
more probable that Gorgias assisted at his brother’s request; there is no glory in rhetoric
exerting itself over medicine. In a similar manner, the examples of Themistocles and
Pericles previously given also show how rhetoric was subservient to the greater interests
of the common good of the state.
Second, it is possible that he can think of no good example of the exercise of this
power unless it reveals his ambivalence toward justice or an unjust exercise of the power.
The best he can do is exculpate himself by claiming (insincerely) that rhetoric is taught
justly, thereby placing the blame of unjust use on wayward students. Gorgias has no guilt
blaming students in this way because through his practice of rhetoric he never committed
an overt act of injustice. This raises an important point when talking about the unjust
side of rhetoric: power. Ranasinghe describes Gorgias’s desire for power well, “The
sophists see human beings as so many frogs living around a Mediterranean Sea of words,
but [Gorgias] does not seek to be the Frog-King’s speechwriter or a predatory Water
Moccasin” (2009, 32). Unlike the other participants in the dialogue, Gorgias has little or
no desire for power, which is why he can remain amoral toward justice and virtue. The
greater desire for power by the other participants will force them to adopt an immoral
stance.
Realizing that Gorgias anticipates an embarrassing attack upon rhetoric or
himself, Socrates slows down to coddle the rhetor again. Dodds notes that “Plato was
always careful to distinguish Socratic dialectic, which aims only at the attainment of
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truth, from its vulgar counterfeit, the ‘eristic’ or ‘antilogic,’ which aims at personal
victory” (1959, 213). The coddling here, however, is more to prepare the rhetor for the
next potential knock to rhetoric rather than reassure him of the argument’s importance
over verbal victory. Socrates is about to reveal the greatest evil.
The coddling at this part emphasizes that Socrates is happier to be refuted than to
refute because it is “the greater good to be released oneself from the greatest evil…For I
think that nothing is so great an evil for a human being as false opinion about the things
that our argument now happens to be about” (458a-b). The argument currently is about
the just use of rhetoric. A false opinion about the just use of rhetoric is a false opinion
about justice itself, which is the greatest evil.
Several reasons show why this has been an overlooked aspect in the Gorgias.
One is that the definition of the greatest evil gets confused during the dialogue. Two
other places where Socrates speaks of the greatest evil show it as doing injustice, and
doing injustice without suffering the just penalty (469b, 479d). While these bear
similarities to one another, the difference between them boils down to thought versus
action. Which is worse, thinking or committing an unjust act? Even though committing
an unjust act in ignorance might make thought the more heinous part, most seem to side
with the commission. But referring again to the point made by Hobbes, actions proceed
from opinion, or thought. Additionally, the drama of the dialogue will show that false
opinion is the greater concern for the participants as no one truly has the stomach to
actually commit such unjust deeds as they extol.
A second reason why false opinion is the greatest evil is overlooked is simply
that, it gets overlooked. The topics of discussion in the dialogue bounce around with
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great variety. The question about rhetoric turns into a discussion on flattery, then
tyranny, followed by punishment, shame, justice, philosophy, politics, pleasure, good,
happiness, injury, courage, and death. With so many topics receiving attention, this
sentence gets only passing mention by commentators, like Olympiodorus, who simply
emphasizes that a false opinion about a great matter leads to great harm (1998, 107).
Dodds also gives it passing mention, recognizing that “something more fundamental (is
at stake), a whole weltanschauungg,” relating it to two other references about man’s
happiness at 472c and 500c (1959, 215), but fails to make a larger connection to anything
else in the dialogue. Closer attention to these passages about happiness make clear the
importance of having a correct opinion about justice in order to obtain happiness.
A third and final reason why the greatest evil being a false opinion of justice is
overlooked is that Socrates appears to not be able to persuade anyone in the dialogue.
Toward the end of each section, there are no firm statements of agreement with Socrates
from the discussants, but ambivalent declarations that Socrates is able to make everything
harmonize (460e, 480e, 513c). This causes a focus more on Socrates’s technique rather
than substance, which is revealed to be rhetorical, making rhetoric the sole central theme
of the dialogue rather than a triumvirate of rhetoric, the greatest evil, and politics. But
overlooked link between these themes is that the self-persuasion of noble rhetoric is selfrefutation, to confront and deny our own beliefs in order to correct and adhere to a true
understanding of justice.
A sign of having a false opinion is internal dissonance. The Socratic axiom states
that everyone has the correct, moral understanding of virtue, but for some reason or other
a false opinion takes supremacy. In the lengthy coddling that revealed the greatest evil,
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Socrates notes such a dissonance in Gorgias, claiming that he is “saying things not quite
consequent or consistent with what you were saying at first about rhetoric” (457e). This
is a polite way of bringing up his dissonance, consistent with the rest of the coddling
paragraph.
Socrates spells out this dissonance a little later, swearing “by the dog” that
understanding this is no small matter (461b). The use of the oath “by the dog” turns into
a dramatic element that signals when Socrates is addressing the participants’ internal lack
of harmony. Later on, Socrates will expand this oath to “by the dog, god of the
Egyptians!” (482b). The significance of this is described by Blackwood, Crossett, and
Long. The dog-like god of the Egyptians was Anubis, who, at the doors to the
underworld, would weigh the heart of the recently deceased in order to measure truth and
deception. The weighing of the heart would consist in a “negative confession,” wherein
the dead would make such statements as “I have not done iniquity” and “I have not
uttered falsehood” (Blackwood et al 1962, 318). Only the truthful were allowed to pass.
Socrates, in a similar manner, thus weighs the hearts of his participants against the
Socratic standard of virtue and swears the oath when a falsehood is spoken or otherwise
uncovered.
Rather than pursue his lack of harmony, Gorgias tries to excuse himself from the
argument by stating that the crowd must be tired from listening to him for so long. The
crowd, however, gives an uproar of approval to hear the conversation to its end.
Ashamed to not live up to his offer to answer any question put to him, he reluctantly
continues. His reluctance to further pursue his inconsistency openly is centered upon his
devotion to his art. He is convinced that rhetoric is a good thing despite the bad face it is

23

putting on. He probably believes this because he is so good at it. Being good at it makes
him feel good and therefore it must be good. But at the same time he cannot name why it
is good. He has demonstrated that it is power, but can offer no just example of the art
without diminishing its power with the taint of injustice. Socrates will attempt to show
Gorgias that his ambivalence to virtue is what is keeping him from naming what is good
about rhetoric. In order to do that, Gorgias will have to give real consideration to justice,
a necessary step to overcome his false opinion.
The argument then shows that the rhetor is more persuasive only to the ignorant.
A group of experts would not be persuaded by his seeming knowledge. The whole
system of rhetoric is simply to “discover a certain device of persuasion” to appear to
know (459a-c). This is perhaps a worse blow to rhetoric than demonstrating its tendency
toward injustice. But allowing Gorgias to bring up the question of justice softens the
reception of the this critique. Gorgias can see the implication of this and again he tries to
save it, not by offering what is good to counter what makes it look bad, but again trying
to appeal to its power. Just by learning this one art, still the rhetor “in no way gets the
worse of it from the craftsman” (459c). This seems to be a call for a judgment on the
quality of rhetoric, but Socrates will withhold from stating whether it is good or not until
another time, which will come in the discussion with Polus when the art itself is actually
defined by the philosopher.
Socrates wants Gorgias to stay focused on the issue of justice, so he asks the
obvious question: if rhetoric is about the just and unjust, has the rhetor simply discovered
a device to appear to know justice, or does he really know it? Had he stopped here this
would have been quite a damaging question for Gorgias to answer, but Socrates does
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something interesting. He changes the focus of the question and asks whether the student
of rhetoric needs to know these things before coming to the teacher of rhetoric or can
they be taught later. Gorgias concedes that he would teach his students if they did not
know. Notice that this answer responds only to the second question about the students
and does not directly answer the question about the teacher. Implicit in the concession to
the student question is an acknowledgement for the teacher to truly know justice, but this
goes by with little attention called to it. It is here, in this affirmative response by Gorgias,
that Socrates has made his point: you cannot claim to be ambivalent about justice and
virtue when your art is centered upon them, and your deep care for the art is really a deep
care for justice.
Nichols notes that Gorgias must be feeling two things at this point: intrigue and a
puzzled gratitude (1998, 136). The gratitude stems from being let off easy by not having
to respond directly that the rhetor must be a knower of justice; the intrigue stems from the
next set of questions. Socrates presents a paradox: if someone who learns carpentry is
called a carpenter, is the man who learns justice called a just man? Moreover, as a
carpenter performs carpentry, does the knower of just necessarily do just things (460b)?
Paradox may have been a playful thing for Gorgias, but he sees no levity in what is
presently before him
The logical problems of the argument are obvious. The substitution of a value for
a profession in the analogy given is a not comparing apples to apples. Additionally, there
is no guarantee that the knower of justice will do only justice, never committing injustice.
But this matter of justice is not the main point Socrates is trying to make. His point has
already been made to Gorgias: he cannot take justice and virtue so ambivalently. The
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conclusion of the argument turns the attention of the crowd away from Gorgias the man
to rhetoric the art. Gorgias wants to know why Socrates has not pressed the point against
himself, and that is why he will remain as a small, but crucial, participant in the dialogue.
Gorgias, the father of rhetoric and sophistic, was a novel writer to be sure. But it
was not his novelty in writing that attracted Socrates, but his sincerity for his art and his
ambivalence to virtue. His sincerity for his art will make him open to a discussion that
will lead to a deeper discussion about justice and virtue. If the dialogue were a polemic
against rhetoric then Socrates passed up some very opportune moments to attack. The
purpose of the dialogue, however, is to combat the greatest evil, having a false opinion
about justice. Socrates is successful in getting Gorgias to open himself up to what he
really thinks about justice and what the consequences of his beliefs mean for his art and
his life. He recognizes that Socrates is not out to harm him, both by the many cautious
statements denying the desire for mere verbal victory and by actually passing up the
many opportunities to humiliate the rhetor in front of a large crowd. But to really push
Gorgias over the edge to make him confront the consequences of his ambivalence toward
justice, Socrates will have Gorgias see the fruit of his labor. Perhaps because he was in
so much demand Gorgias never stayed in any place long enough to see how his pupils
would use the art he had taught them. But now, one of his students will take over the
discussion, forcing Gorgias to come to grips with what a promise of power without the
restraints of virtue looks like.
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CHAPTER 3
POLUS
Polus of Acgras, like his teacher Gorgias, is also from Sicily. His name in Greek
means “colt,” which suits his nature as he is young and brash, often careless as well. He
is an advanced student in rhetoric, having written a treatise on the subject that Socrates
mentions at 462b, apparently familiar enough with it to quote it. This makes Polus
something like a published graduate student. He is mentioned by Socrates in the
Phaedrus and Aristotle in the Metaphysics also makes a short note about him. Otherwise,
little else is known about the historical person.
What purpose does Polus have in the dialogue? He is treated harshly in the
literature, many noting how dim-witted he is and how badly he argues. Most treat him as
a simple stepping stone to get to the real meat of the dialogue: the Callicles section.
These statements are true but miss the larger point. Each successive participant opens the
existing discussion a little further, brings out a little more of the bitterness in the work,
and also goes in new directions. The previous chapter ended with the thought that
Gorgias needed to view what his art produced in order to turn away from his false
opinions of justice and virtue. But Polus himself will also present his own unique false
opinions.
So what false opinions does Polus have? The drama of the dialogue reveals it.
Polus first appears in the very beginning, before Gorgias utters a word. Socrates asks his
companion Chaerephon to ask the rhetor “who he is,” but it is Polus who impetuously
jumps in to answer. His justification for answering in place of his teacher is that he can
answer as well as his teacher (448b). His answers, however, prove no better than
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Gorgias’s first responses. Instead of offering a direct answer he delves into a detailed
praise of the art, apparently quoting himself from his own work. Because no praise or
defense was called for, Socrates accuses Polus of practicing rhetoric, which is the first
mention of the term in the dialogue (448d).
Polus’s response to the accusation of not answering but practicing rhetoric is “did
not I answer that it was the finest?” (448e). This response is very telling. This mistake of
stating worth in lieu of a definition is a mistake all the participants will make, but perhaps
Polus takes this correction a little personally. Like his master, Polus has a deep care for
rhetoric, but unlike his master, it is not a care for the art itself. It is a care for what the art
can get him: power and reputation. Everything he does in the dialogue is to set himself
up as a good rhetor, which takes the form of praising and protecting the art itself. This
will lead him to claim that the rhetor is like a tyrant, powerful enough to do anything he
desires, such as beat, steal, and kill at will (466b). This praise of injustice, however, is all
show, for Polus has courage enough only to commit the injustice of being ungrateful
toward his teacher by trying to establish himself as greater. Socrates will thus go about
combating this false opinion by eroding what Polus thinks is good about rhetoric and
reputation.
As noted, his initial interruption was to prove his rhetoric is as sufficient as that of
his teacher. His subsequent interruption that begins his long section in the dialogue is
upon slightly different grounds, that he knows what Gorgias knows (462a). These two
things, being equal in style and knowledge, put him on par with his teacher, but what sets
him above is that, unlike his teacher, he will not fall prey to shame. It was shame that
caused Gorgias to admit that he would teach the knowledge of the just to his students if
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they did not know them (461b). It was fear of the crowd, losing students, being deported,
but mostly fear of defacing rhetoric that caused Gorgias to go along with Socrates.
Unlike his master, Polus is courageous (or shameless) enough to fully speak his mind.
Polus is correct that it was shame that caused Gorgias to admit that rhetoric is
about the just and unjust, but it was not shame that caused him to fall silent toward the
end. Gorgias’s silence came from a sudden self-realization brought about by Plato’s
paradox: can an art about the just and unjust not truly know or care about justice?
Gorgias is beginning to think this is not possible. The young colt jumps into the
conversation so fast it is difficult to discern whether Gorgias would have continued the
conversation. His subsequent contributions to the dialogue suggest that he would have.
The apparent shamelessness of Polus to speak his true mind on these things points
toward his own false opinions about justice. Much like his teacher, he has a sense of
ambivalence toward the question of justice. This stems mostly from a lack of intent to
actually commit injustice, or at least overt acts of injustice. The student, however, is
more self-centered than the teacher, and desires from rhetoric not an art, but reputation.
He truly is an example of the unjust student Gorgias outlined, which will make this part
of the dialogue a pertinent example of what his craft, a practice that teaches the power of
power without the restraints of morality, looks like. In this way, the Polus section is a
continued conversation with Gorgias as well as an attempt to address the false opinions of
Polus.
Polus’s lack of sincerity toward rhetoric will cause Socrates to refrain from the
coddling he showed Gorgias. His large ego will call for a harsher refutation than Gorgias
needed. As a result Socrates will begin to display the bitterness the dialogue is known
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for. But why is bitterness necessary? Fussi describes it well when she writes, “we can
understand why the Gorgias sounds so bitter to its readers. It is as bitter as the bitter
drugs Socrates claims to be administering to his interlocutors. It is the work of a doctor,
not that of a cook. It uses rhetorical devices, not to please us, but so that we may be
willing to discard them” (2000, 54). Gorgias’s anecdote of the doctor and the rhetorician
becomes more pertinent now. The cure for a false opinion about justice is in the
understanding of the nature of justice, which is the work of the philosopher. Socrates can
offer them a cure, but it will be a doctor offering it to a stubborn patient who refuses to
submit to treatment. So rather than elaborate on the nature of justice, Socrates will play
the role of the rhetor and use rhetoric to persuade them to refute their own false opinions.
Since rhetoric is not a didactic art, Socrates will not be teaching about justice, but using a
persuasive device to convince the participants that their own opinions are false. As such,
the arguments presented in the Polus section will contain several logic flaws; they are not
perfect proofs about the tenets they uphold. Rather than reveal absolute truth, they will
reveal how Polus feels about justice, which is the first step toward self-refutation.
The first difference in treatment tailored for Polus is that he is allowed to ask the
questions. This is unusual for a Platonic dialogue; Socrates typically serves as the
questioner and rarely gives as frank an answer as he does here. This, however, is mere
placebo for Polus. Though he thinks he is in control of the discussion, Socrates will
blatantly direct Polus on which questions to ask and how to ask them, eventually
assuming the reigns of questioning completely. Right from the first question, which asks
for a definition of rhetoric, Socrates redirects how the questioning proceeds. Before
asking what rhetoric is, Socrates states that what is needed first is to know whether it is
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an art (462b). It is no art, but rather an experience “in the production of a certain grace
and pleasure” (462c).
Not even attempting to understand what this means Polus asks if this definition
does not mean that rhetoric is a fine thing. Throughout, Polus will seek the
commendation of rhetoric, which really serves his own aggrandizement. Socrates,
however, is afraid to give a fuller meaning of rhetoric in fear of offending Gorgias, who
might think that Socrates is trying to attack him personally. This further coddling of
Gorgias, even when he is not the main participant in the dialogue, is the first proof that
Socrates is not done conversing with the rhetor (Friedländer 1969, 253). But Gorgias
gives his assurance and encourages the philosopher to “speak without feeling ashamed
before me” (463a). What might be added to the end of that is “unlike how I was ashamed
to speak before you,” a sign that the rhetor has begun to take the pill of self-refutation.
Socrates’s initial inquiry of Gorgias was to discover the power of the art and to
ascertain what the rhetor professes and teaches. The former was discussed, the latter only
slightly and indirectly. But all along Socrates has had a “suspicion” of what Gorgias
teaches. Although Socrates offers his last coddling of Gorgias by suggesting that he is
unsure that what he is about to say is “the same rhetoric that Gorgias pursues,” what is
described seems to be exactly what the rhetor pursues and teaches (462e; Stauffer 2006,
44).
Rhetoric is a part of flattery. It is not an art, but simply an experience, learned by
someone good at guessing with sufficient cleverness and courage. It belongs with the
other experiences that shadow true arts: cookery, cosmetic, and sophistry. Flattery thus
consists of these four parts, and rhetoric is the part of flattery that is the phantom of
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politics (463b-d). Polus, however, is still not listening, for he immediately asks whether
rhetoric is a fine thing or not. Socrates responds no, it is not fine, but shameful. At this
point someone who is listening, Gorgias, interrupts and admits he does not comprehend,
to which Socrates concurs that he has not said anything clear yet. The conversation now
takes an important dramatic turn and puts Gorgias back in the participant’s seat. With an
active, open participant, Socrates is able to pursue a more dialectical course and begins a
didactic exposition of the nature of flattery, which will hint toward the nature of justice.
This leads to the discussion of what Plochman and Robinson call “the Divided Oblong”
(1988, 63-70). There are other, more simple, diagrams that outline what Socrates
explains here, but Plochman and Robinson correctly see that the structure created here
creates “a context that will retain for the rest of the dialogue” (1988, 57).
The name is derived from its similarity to the divided line in Book 6 of the
Republic (509d-513e). The subject matter of the divided line of the Republic is onedimensional, dealing with the nature of existence, the subject matter in the Gorgias is
two-dimensional, extending the line into a rectangle, or oblong. The oblong outlines the
best care of both body and soul. The example runs from 464b-466a, and goes as follows:
there exist both body and soul and each has a particular business, or art, which governs it,
looking toward what is best. The business of the soul is politics; the business of the body
Socrates is unable to name. While the business of both body and soul is singular, each art
branches into two parts, gymnastic and medicine for the body and the legislative art and
justice for the soul. Then came flattery, which by luck and experience discovered how to
mimic these true arts, replacing the care of the best with folly and whatever is pleasant.
In a geometrical fashion, the correlating flatteries align with the true arts as follows: “as
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cosmetic is to gymnastic, so is sophistry to the legislative art; as cookery is to medicine,
so is rhetoric to justice” (465c).
There is a significant amount of work going on is this framework. There is a
juxtaposition of internal versus external. It is easy to recognize the external nature of the
body compared to the internal soul, as well as the external beauty gymnastic creates and
the internal health made by medicine. But if this dichotomy is to be used throughout the
framework, it becomes a little more difficult to understand legislation as external and
justice as internal. To complicate this, while the idea of a soul is intuitively internal, an
understanding of politics is not. More on this internal/external aspect will be discussed
shortly.
Also involved is a suggested, though not explicit stated, hierarchy of the arts.
While the divisions within body and soul share similarities they also maintain distinct
differences, though what these differences are goes unmentioned (464c). Stauffer
believes that the lack of differentiation suggests “the difference is between seeking the
correction of an ill condition (medicine/justice) and the pursuit of further development
beyond a basic state of health (gymnastic/legislation)” (2006, 46). In other words, he
puts the external factors as deserving a higher place than the internal ones. Plochman and
Robinson agree, and conclude that legislation and sophistic are the true arts of body and
soul that Socrates is trying to emphasize (1988, 68).
What leads Stauffer to make this assumption is an unspoken implication that this
framework makes about justice: “namely, that justice serves merely to remedy a flawed
situation” (2006, 46). I disagree. As Stauffer would outline it, the art of politics is the art
of legislation, meaning that perfect laws will achieve a perfection to politics; justice is
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merely a corrective principle to help achieve this perfection. This suggests that flawed
legislation simply lacks justice, but what I believe is being presented is that flawed
legislation is a reflection of flawed justice. The art of politics is not to create perfect
laws, but to create perfect justice. From perfect justice will flow perfect laws, and both
working together will create perfection to the art of politics.
The suggested hierarchy should thus put the internal over the external. Medicine
ranks over gymnastic because even the most beautiful body can fall victim to horrible
disease, rendering the body terribly unhealthy. Though lacking nothing in the appearance
of perfection, an internal disease can render the body useless. Similarly, laws may have
the appearance of justice, possibly even providing great benefits such as wealth and
power to the community, but appearances can be deceiving. The only way to ensure that
justice pervades the laws is to be a knower of justice. It requires a complete
understanding of the nature of justice. This is why the greatest evil is to have a false
opinion about justice: justice ranks the highest on importance in what is best for human
beings.
The question still remains as to why the business/art of the soul is politics. If a
complete understanding of justice is what is required to perfect the most important aspect
of human excellence, then shouldn’t Socrates claim the business of the soul is
philosophy? Additionally, politics seems to be an external thing; would not it be a more
appropriate name for the business/art of the body? One possibility is that naming the art
of the soul as politics may be a rhetorical function. Shortly after finishing this illustration
Socrates notes how he has just “done something strange”: that he just finished a long,
extended speech when he had forbidden Polus from doing the same thing (465e).
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Additionally, the Divided Oblong may not be a complete account of the hierarchy of the
best condition of both body and soul and their corresponding arts, but simply a device to
persuade. There are several questions that suggest this framework is incomplete: do the
businesses of both body and soul really only boil down to their two respective branches?
Why does flattery desire to mimic the true arts? Does it simply seek folly and pleasure
on whim, or is there something more to it? Where do the examples Gorgias gave of
Pericles and Themistocles fit into politics as the art of the soul? Surely their work to
establish Athens as an imperial power is tied to legislation but seems more directed at the
body?
Though lacking in a fullness of content, and laced with rhetoric, this framework
still represents Socrates’s thoughts and opinions. What it takes to wrap this all together is
further clarification on the art of politics, which will come in the Callicles section. To
address the false opinions of Gorgias and Polus, completing this illustration is not
necessary, which is why after establishing this framework, Socrates changes direction.
He has just made an important connection between rhetoric and justice and could
continue on that point to further educate Gorgias, but instead he turns the argument back
over to Polus, leaving justice behind and returning to flattery. The reason flattery, and
thus rhetoric, is no art is because it provides no reasoned account, no logos, “as to what
sort of things they are in their nature” (465a).
Polus, however, pays no attention to the greater lesson of the Divided Oblong,
focusing only on rhetoric as part of flattery. Concerned with praising rhetoric (and
himself) Polus asks if rhetoric is simply flattery, which is more of a statement that he
does not agree that it is as base as Socrates has made it seem. His follow-up question
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asks whether rhetors are esteemed as lowly flatters, which is again more of a statement
than a question. With Gorgias present, and the large crowd that has come to hear him,
Polus’s understanding that the rhetor is indeed esteemed highly is obvious, and so is his
desire to be esteemed like Gorgias.
Socrates, recognizing that Polus is not making any progress, starts a new strategy.
Moving away from answering whether rhetoric is noble or base he instead asserts that
rhetors are neither esteemed nor powerful. This takes the wind out of Polus’s sails, for
these are the two things he desires from rhetoric. But this tactic is successful in directing
Polus toward the topic of justice.
Polus’s reply is largely misunderstood. His reply is that rhetors are powerful like
tyrants, who kill, steal, and expel whom and what they wish (466c). This has led to
commentators referring to the “tyrant Polus,” or other such remarks that define his true
desire as reigning like a tyrant (Ranasinghe 2009, 55). This is almost the complete
opposite of the case. Polus has no desire to be a tyrant; he has no stomach for tyrannical
acts, as will be shown in the course of the dialogue. The introduction of the tyrant serves
as a reference to esteem the power of the rhetor. Of all the commentators on this
dialogue Stauffer seems to understand it best as he refers to this argument as “rhetoriciantyrant” example, emphasis on the rhetor (2006, 51).
All the praise and admiration of the tyrant ultimately points back to the power of
the rhetor. Understanding this reveals the false opinion that Polus carries about justice.
As a sign that Socrates is preparing to confront Polus’s false opinion, he again swears “by
the dog” and asserts that even Polus does not believe the things Polus is saying (466ce).
This dissonance derives from internal conflict with the Socratic Axiom, the
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understanding that everyone holds to virtue as good for the soul, regardless of what we
claim to believe.
The medicine needed to cure Polus’s false opinion has to be a strong one to match
his ego, so Socrates lays it on heavy here. He overbearingly asserts himself against the
young rhetor, demanding a refutation from him. Perplexed, all Polus can do is insult
Socrates, to which Socrates charges that if Polus cannot ask then he should answer.
Perhaps a little relieved at the offer Polus gives up the reigns of questioner (467c). Back
in the driver’s seat, Socrates will continue to administer to Polus the bitter pill that will
bring him to a realization of his internal conflict over justice.
He begins with explaining why tyrants do not do what they wish. The basic
premise is that we all wish for what is best, and all things that we do are for the sake of
that good (468c). The importance here is that we do not take certain actions just to
perform those actions, but all actions point toward some end. Therefore, the power of the
tyrant to kill, steal, and expel at will is irrational, for he does not do these things simply
on whim, but for something beneficial. And when the tyrant is mistaken about what is
beneficial, his power to kill is no power at all.
While it may be true that our actions point toward some ultimate good, the logic
of the argument does not establish that following after a mistaken good leads to a lack of
power. This point has not gone unnoticed, but those who focus on the logical flaws miss
the greater point that Irwin states well:
So Socrates’s conclusion that someone who fails to do what is good for him
thereby shows that he has no power is unjustified; Polus is still free to maintain
that the rhetor or tyrant is powerful. But Socrates has shown that if I do not have
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correct beliefs about what is good for me, I lack the power to achieve my own
good, which I want above all, and so I lack the power which is an unqualified
good promoting my over-all welfare. (1979, 146)
Polus realizes this to a degree, but he still is confused about his ultimate good. This
reveals a desire for and concordance with justice, but there is one major problem still
confronting him: being just often means being unjustly acted upon. Is not it then better to
do such things, even kill unjustly, if it means a certain protection from suffering
injustice?
Socrates firmly responds in the negative, confirming that “doing injustice happens
to be the greatest evil” (469b). Understanding Polus’s thought here shows how the
greatest evil presented as committing injustice really points back to his false opinion. So
Polus challenges Socrates on that point the only way he can think of, claiming that even
the philosopher would prefer to do injustice than suffer it. But Socrates holds his ground.
Polus is not yet convinced, and he falls back to one of his original tenets- having power is
doing what one wants according to his opinion. Polus is trying to throw out that we need
to question our opinions, for it seems obvious that everyone wants to seek their desires,
have the power to do so, and not suffer is the course of the exercising that power (469c).
The witness of the many here overpowers most of the progress that Polus has made in
questioning his own opinions. Surely so many people cannot be wrong.
As his response, Socrates offers the allegory of the dagger. The allegory supposes
that Socrates came into possession of a dagger and, showing it to Polus, claimed that he
has assumed a great, tyrannical power that will allow him to kill, beat, and otherwise
exercise great power. The reason that this is no great power is because a punishment is
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sure to follow. But the real reason Socrates offers this allegory is to get Polus to think
about punishment and offers a way to be able to do these tyrannical things without
punishment. Polus, however, is disappointed when the philosopher reveals that these acts
go unpunished when they are done justly (470c). Polus was expecting the Archelaus
answer, which is what he offers as his rebuttal.
Archelaus of Macedon rose to power by committing a slew of murders of his
family members. Polus details many of his gruesome acts on the premise that these
things had made him happy (471a-d). Socrates will have none of it, for a man’s
happiness is measured by his education and justice. But rather than focus on happiness,
on elaborating on why education and justice are appropriate measurements, Socrates
instead outlines how the Archelaus answer is merely a rhetorical attack. This is the more
appropriate course to attack Polus’s false opinions about justice.
There are three rhetorical techniques that Polus employs. First, his rhetorical
attack resorts to the witness of the many. There are two problems with this, one being
that even the witness of many can still be false, and the other being that the sheer number
of the witnesses often is sufficient to persuade without hearing the other side. Socrates
notes this latter aspect when he states that Polus is “attempting to expel (him) from (his)
substance and truth” (472b).
Rather than many witnesses Socrates will provide just one, Polus himself, to
prove his point. This becomes Socrates’s main point to demonstrate, to set the two
refutations side by side, that of the many against that of the one, to show which is better
when searching for truth. Proving the latter over the former will help Polus come to
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understand his own stance on justice, for Socrates uses this method to answer the chief
point between them, “how to either know or ignore who is happy and who is not” (472d).
Second, Polus’s rhetorical attack relies on “frightening with bogeymen” (473d).
Polus tries to back up his points by outlining the horrible consequences of being unjustly
acted upon, including being tortured, castrated, and killed. The truth of the matter is that
when justice is concerned there can be no fear of these things, even if it means death
(480d, 522e). Socrates can state this because his few acts in politics threatened him with
these things, including his refusal to call to vote the condemnation of the generals at the
battle of Arginusae, as well as his refusal to recall Leon the Salaminian (474a, Apology
32c).
Third, Polus’s rhetorical attack relies on ad hominem. Polus laughs at Socrates
(473e). Not only does this suggest that what Socrates says is comical, but it suggests that
Polus knows why it is comical and what should be properly said in its place. A laugh like
this is just another way of pandering to the crowd and persuading them that you know
something.
All of this has a point, it is priming Polus to reveal his false opinion of justice.
Polus states that doing injustice is aischron (shameful), but suffering injustice is kakon
(worse). His admission that injustice is aischron suggests that justice is the opposite of
aischron, being kalos (noble or fine), confirming his concordance with the Socratic
Axiom. Polus can state this because he and every other human being considers it to be so
(474b). This is his only justification, he gives no other grounds how doing injustice can
be both good and shameful other than it appears that way to the many. Dodds clarifies
this as he notes, “Polus said that doing wrong was less admirable, he clearly meant that it
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was ophelimos (profitable) for the community, and from this it does not follow that it is
less ophelimos for the agent” (1959, 249). The young colt believes that justice is good,
but stricken by the many examples he has witnessed of the just man suffering, he claims
it is unprofitable, and thus shameful, twisting his whole sense of justice.
The refutation is short and simple (474d-475d). Something is fine on account of
its beauty or benefit. Conversely, something is shameful if it is the opposite of these,
being pain and badness. So for one thing to be more shameful than another it must
exceed in either pain or evil. Polus has called doing injustice more shameful than
suffering injustice, so it must exceed in either pain or evil. It is not more painful, so
doing injustice is worse on account of it evilness/badness. So more shameful also means
worse.
To all of this Polus finally concedes, though he does not know why. His answers
reveal his confusion: “It looks that way,” “It seems so, at least according to the
argument,” “So it appears” (475de). None is a clear exclamation of his acceptance or
approval; all show some ambivalence. It is clear from how the argument unfolds that
Polus becomes less clear about his own definition, unsure of how to define his key terms.
Archie calls this “dialectic chicanery” that undid Polus (1984, 167). Vlastos, claiming
Polus just needed to keep his wits about him, also accuses Socrates of a logical fallacy,
stating the question should be to whom is injustice more painful, the agent or the observer
(1967, 458).
All of these are correct on their points of logic, but the logic is not the point:
To proceed, as so many have done, to analyze Socrates’s argument as if it
purported to be a logical proof of the preferability of suffering injustice, rather
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than as a demonstration that Polus and everybody else already believes it to be
preferable, is to exhibit a rather impenetrable insensitivity to Plato’s dramatic
signals…thus his argument is designed to encourage Polus to choose justice.
(McKim 1988, 37)
Polus seems dimwitted because he does not truly believe the tenet he proposes and cannot
argue accordingly. The worse and the shameful are equivalent to him. He proposes a
differentiation to win the argument and gain his reputation. Socrates is not so much
attempting to convince him of the absolute truth that suffering injustice is not worse than
doing injustice, as he is forcing Polus to confront his false opinion that injustice can be
both good and bad. The drama directly after this refutation reflects this point just made.
Socrates has to first drag the refutation out of Polus, admonishing him to “not
shrink from answering, you will suffer no harm. Submit yourself in a nobly born manner
to the argument as to a doctor” (475d). Evoking the image of the doctor should bring to
mind the purpose of rhetoric, recognizing that this proof is more of a non-didactic
persuasive device to inspire belief. This is not to say that Socrates himself does not hold
to the argument. He truly believes that injustice is the greatest evil. But instead of
reinforcing this idea after the refutation, Socrates puts the focus on the manner of
refutation: “so you see then, Polus, that when one refutation is put beside the other, they
don’t look like each other at all” (475e). Polus’s faith in the refutation by the witness of
the many is shaken. If his desire for a good professional reputation relies on the witness
of the many, what does this refutation signify about what Polus considers as his ultimate
good? With his ultimate good in question, Polus is open to refutation on his false opinion
toward justice.
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The rest of the Polus section is devoid of bitterness. Polus has been refuted and
perhaps has no more fight in him, but Socrates also becomes more generous in his
treatment of the young man. The concluding argument will prove the second point of
what Polus unknowingly asked, whether it is better to suffer the just penalty. Socrates
asks to whom the unjust man goes in order to be cured from his illness. The sick man
goes to the doctor, where does the unjust man go? Polus suggests it is to the judges
(478a). Socrates will work with this, but it is the wrong answer. What Polus has failed to
realize is that he has just suffered the just penalty. Referring again to the Divided
Oblong, medicine is to the body as justice is to the soul. But is it the same saying that the
doctor is to the body as the judge is to the soul?
If, as Plochman and Robinson believe, the external factors of the Divided Oblong
deserved the top hierarchical spot then Polus would be correct in stating that the judges
cure injustice. Justice, in this sense, simply requires interpretation and correct application
of the law, which will correct unjust acts. But justice as the internal factor with the prime
point of importance on the Divided Oblong is understood in a different way. Though
justice does not receive an explicit definition in the dialogue, the fact that Socrates strives
to have his participants face their false opinions that govern their souls suggests that
justice merits a similar definition here as it does in the Republic. Justice is an
understanding of the correct way to act through a structuring an organization of the soul,
through the placing of prudence over passion, virtue over vice, knowledge over opinion,
etc. It is thus to the philosopher, who can reveal this nature of justice, that someone with
false opinions about the virtue needs to turn in order to suffer the just penalty, which is
exactly what Polus has just experienced.
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This raises a pertinent question: does knowing what the nature of justice is ensure
being just? Socrates had begun this question in the Gorgias section, and now the Divided
Oblong shows that this is not the case. The two parts of the soul art of politics are justice
and the legislative art. Justice has been discussed, but what is the legislative art? Like
justice, the legislative art does not receive a detailed explanation in the dialogue, but
perhaps Socrates means something like this: it is the enforcement of the justice.
Understanding justice creates a hierarchy of principles within the soul. The legislative art
is the actual decision making process of how to live according to that hierarchy. It is the
structuring and regulation of behavior in accordance with justice, guided by selfdiscipline and moderation. The knowledge of how to act and the regulation to act
accordingly combined is the true art of politics.
Socrates, rather than opening up this deeper line of thought (which will be saved
for the Callicles section) instead tries to reinforce the idea of suffering the just
punishment by stating that this can be the only good use of rhetoric: to accuse parents,
comrades, and children of the injustice they have done to the end that they submit to the
just penalty (480bc). If a correct understanding of justice is already had, then there is no
need for a self-refutation to seek justice’s true understanding through philosophical
inquiry. Polus admits that there is a certain logic to this statement, but it still seems
strange to him (480d). In other words, he is not fully convinced. Had he realized that
this dialectical exchange really did bring him no harm, as he feared might happen to his
reputation, he might have realized that Socrates has something to offer. Had he realized
that Socrates had been playing the role of the rhetor in order to turn Polus toward selfrefutation of his false opinions he might have had an enlightening experience as to his
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own profession. But he realizes none of this. Soon Callicles will jump in and attack
where he feels Socrates played unfairly. With Callicles on his side, Polus will feel
courageous enough to fall back on hi false opinion (511b). This shows how susceptible
he is to the opinion of the many. . This is why Polus is no real tyrant. He lacks the
strength to stand alone. He has no stomach for being so courageous.
To summarize, Polus is a young and semi-accomplished student of Gorgias. All
his interactions leading up to his main role in the dialogue are to establish himself as
equal to or greater than his teacher. Above all, he desires to be more famous than
Gorgias. He is an example of what an amoralistic teaching of rhetoric offered by Gorgias
produces, and this is perhaps the first time that Gorgias can see the effects of his
ambivalence toward justice. For half of the discussion Polus is simply focused on
praising rhetoric, establishing it as a fine and good thing. This focus puts blinders on him
to the greater meaning of the argument, which is to open Polus to his false opinions about
justice.
Polus learned from his teacher a certain ambivalence toward justice, but the
suffering of the just at the hands of the unjust leads him later to hold that justice is good,
but doing injustice is merely shameful. It is his desire for power (manifested as
reputation) that causes him to leave his ambivalence for this immorality. It may be safe
to have an ambivalence toward justice if there are no unjust deeds that follow, but Polus
is willing to act unjustly, to a point at least. He may lack courage to do the things that
would make him a powerful tyrant, but he is willing to publically discredit his teacher in
order to make himself appear greater.
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It is not only a lack of grit that keeps him from extreme unjust deeds, but deep
down Polus also holds to the Socratic Axiom. He is perhaps disappointed that justice
does not seem powerful enough to protect the just from suffering injustice, and has
instead found his answer in the power of rhetoric. This leads him to become dissonant
with himself, still wanting justice but looking to other things to fill in where he feels it
lacks. Socrates is successful in at least momentarily showing to Polus that rhetoric is not
as powerful as he hopes it to be either. The way Socrates was able to do this is similar to
the anecdote of the rhetor and the doctor that Gorgias relayed earlier in the dialogue. The
true cure for Polus is for him to come to an understanding of justice and to align himself
with its demands rather than demand from justice things on his own terms. A philosophic
education is necessary to come to such a reasoned account of justice and virtue. But as a
philosopher, Socrates is unable to persuade the sick Polus to submit to the treatment;
instead, Socrates as rhetorician is able to at least persuade Polus to be open to the
possibility. But as noted, Callicles steps in and attacks Socrates anew. For the last half
of the discussion Polus had been alone. He had lost the witness of the many that once
supported him as he became Socrates’s witness. But now someone is on his side again,
or rather, there is someone he can side with, and he falls back to all his former opinions,
losing any progress on his false opinions toward justice that had been made.
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CHAPTER 4
CALLICLES
Few facts are known of Gorgias, fewer of Polus, and nothing of Callicles. There
is a question as to whether he was an actual, historical person or simply a fictional
character. Dodds seems persuaded that Callicles, if not a real Athenian himself, is at least
based on a real person who more than likely was killed during the purges of the Thirty
Tyrants (1959, 13). Callicles is a tough opponent of philosophy, perhaps the toughest in
the Platonic corpus. He is tough enough to be praised by the likes of Nietzsche. But
though Plato put this toughness into this character, he also seems to have taken great time
and care into him to reflect more than that. A first reading of Callicles will show a
confident, patriotic man attacking philosophy in the name of business and politics, the
truly manly arts, but who then becomes so frustrated by Socrates that he shuts down
completely. He appears unreachable by philosophy. A close reading, with attention to
the drama, will reveal why he shuts down, showing that Socrates words do affect him in a
deep manner, creating a glimmer of hope for Callicles and philosophy.
Jaeger is one of a few in the literature to note how deep the care that Plato puts
into Callicles is. His first reason to assume so is to look to Plato’s biography. Plato was
exposed to the political life in Athens from a very early age by his noble birth and
aristocratic education. His family members who were politically active included
Charicles and Critias, who both took roles in the reign of the Thirty Tyrants.
these sources that
Plato may have drawn upon for Callicles. Jaeger continues:
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It is from

He must have immersed himself deeply in their thought, to express it with such
convincing vividness, such overwhelming force as he does through Callicles…
Perhaps we have not given thought to the possibility that in his own character
Plato had so much of the unruly will to power as to din, and fight, part of himself
in Callicles. (1943, 137-138, emphasis added)
Skemp concurs, writing, “may not this cultivated and ambitious young man who has
lately entered public life represent Plato himself- what Plato might have been but chose
not to be?” (1987, 29). Perhaps these feelings are not to mirror those of family members,
but come from Plato himself, making Callicles a semi-autobiographical character. This I
find very convincing. Callicles represents the “other” side so well that it suggests such a
deep familiarity that internal conflict about these topics could give birth to.
Another clue that perhaps point toward an autobiographical Callicles includes
Plato’s carefulness in putting himself in his dialogues. He is never a speaker in the
dialogues and is only mentioned in a few. This makes it difficult to figure out what his
thoughts are exactly because as all characters are part of his literary creation he is putting
the words in everyone’s mouth. With that said, claiming that Callicles is Plato does not
suggest that Callicles is a complete autobiographical sketch. Neither does it suggest that
only Callicles out of the whole Platonic corpus represents the author’s thoughts, nor does
it mean that any other character with a questionable historical background is meant to
portray a personal side of the author. But the reading of Callicles, with attention to the
drama given him in the Gorgias, shows a careful understanding of his position, which is
not as shallow as it appears to be.
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Another clue is the dramatic date of the dialogue. There are several historical
references in the work that are conflicting, making it impossible to fix a specific date as
to when the conversation took place, if it was an actual occurrence. Gorgias was known
to have visited Athens a few times, but the earliest was when he was sent as an
ambassador from his home colony to plead for the aid of the Athenians against Syracuse
in 427 BCE. This date coincides with the mention of Pericles having just died, which
occurred in 429 BCE (503c). But then the ambiguities begin. The climax of the Polus
section, the history of the tyrant Archelaus, is said to be happenings of “just yesterday”
(470d). Archelaus rose to power in 414 BCE. Socrates, in detailing his response to Polus
as to not being one of his “political men” relates his experience as president of the
Council in the trial of the generals of Arginusae, which battle took place in 405 BCE and
the trial shortly thereafter (473e).
So what is the point of this ambiguity of the date? Benardete states it well when
he states the dialogue “is of a time but not in time” (1991, 7). Of what time is Plato
trying to draw our attention to? The first word of the dialogue is “war,” and indeed, the
suggested dates span the length of the Peloponnesian war (Ranasinghe 2009, 16).
Perhaps more importantly, the suggested dates also span Plato’s youth. He is thought to
be born between 429-424 BCE, making the earliest reference of Pericles’ death also a
possible coincidence of his birth (Nails 2002, 243). Some of the later dates end during
the reign of the Thirty Tyrants. It has already been noted that Plato had a strong
connection to politics from early on, including several family members as leaders of the
thirty. Could the ambiguity of time be a metaphor for the development of Plato’s
political becoming?
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What does this mean for the dialogue if in fact Callicles is, at least in part is, Plato
himself? Callicles is called a hedonist, a nihilist, and other branding terms, and he speaks
with exceptional force against philosophy that has a timeless character that rings true for
some today; for such a character to eventually overcome these things and turn himself
over to philosophy is a bright hope to combat the natural tendency of many to emphasize
the problems of justice.
The discussion with the young Athenian begins with his interjection to ascertain
whether Socrates is serious or not. This sarcastic and confrontational remark is met by a
lengthy reply, noting that it is through a community of feelings shared among human
beings that allows us to converse about things (481c). By this Socrates is pointing back
to the Socratic Axiom, and elaborates indirectly by showing how both he and Callicles
are lovers. Callicles is a lover of the Athenian people, the demos, and the son of
Pyrilampes named Demos; he is unable to contradict either one and thus turns every
which way to please them (481e). Socrates, whose lovers are Alcibiades and philosophy,
only says what philosophy says and stays ever constant.
It becomes clear right at the beginning of their discussion that of the three
participants Socrates knows Callicles. This is either because he is an Athenian, or
because Plato is writing about his own struggles with the Socratic Axiom. Either way, it
is right off the bat that Socrates uses the oath, “by the dog, god of the Egyptians!Callicles will not agree with you Callicles, but you will be dissonant your whole life”
(482b). The emphatic statement of his dissonance is a prelude to the intense bitterness
that will follow.
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Callicles then lays out his famous charge (482c-486d). It opens as a critique of
Socrates’s methods. The philosopher is fond of word catching and substituting
convention for nature and vice versa. Polus was ashamed to hold to injustice being good
but shameful because convention makes it shameful. Nature has it a different way. By
nature the strong rule and have a right to a larger share. The whole history of human
beings and the animal kingdom attest to this. But it is a rabble of slaves and other
weaklings who join together and through convention make it shameful to practice natural
justice. Convention thus takes the roar out of the lions while they are young. A
sufficiently strong man can break these chains and spells to become the master natural
justice demands. Socrates would see this but he is tainted by philosophy.
Philosophy, rather than creating a good, noble, and reputed man, instead only
engenders inexperience. While appropriate for a youth in order to learn articulation,
philosophy in a grown man creates inexperience. The philosopher loses care for the laws
of the city, lacks the ability to associate and speak adequately both publically and
privately, and becomes alienated to human pleasures and desires. All in all, he falls out
of touch with human customs and characters. This makes philosophy ridiculous,
unmanly, and deserving of a beating, causing the philosopher to flee the agora, where a
man becomes distinguished, and sully himself by “whispering with three or four lads in a
corner” (485d).
Callicles speaks all this out of a certain charity towards Socrates. He recognizes
that the philosopher has a noble soul but that he does not do noble things. He should be
speaking in councils about justice. He should be advising new proposals to the polis.
Instead, following his current course will lead him to the law court where he will be
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sentenced to death and powerless to do anything about it. The charge ends with an
admonition to obtain a “livelihood, reputation, and many other good things” (486c).
Socrates sees the difference between Callicles and his previous participants. Both
previous participants only required a narrow approach to address their specific concerns
about justice. Callicles’s concern is more encompassing, driving at a broader question:
“what sort of man one ought to be and what one ought to pursue and how far” (487e).
This is the very question that Guthrie suggests Plato faced in his life and wrote about in
the Gorgias: whether to hold to the tenets of justice that all seem to believe, or to pay
them no heed and seek power and reputation as earned through a political life (Guthrie
1975, 296)
The Polus section was a continuous conversation, albeit indirect, with Gorgias as
an example of what kind of student he produces. The Callicles section will act in a
similar function, to show Gorgias what kind of a politician he makes through his
teaching; Dodds seems to concur with this, noting that “Gorgias’s teaching is the seed of
which the Calliclean way of life is the poisonous fruit” (1959, 15). But Callicles is
unique from the previous two on his stance of justice. Whereas the two foreigners were
mostly ambivalent to justice, different from each only in their desire for power, Callicles
transforms justice and gives it a new definition. Additionally, his desire for power is
more sincere than Polus’s. Polus wants from power only a reputation; he wants the
appearance of power. Callicles seems likely to act on his power, but what he would do
with it is difficult to understand at this point in the dialogue.
The discussion begins anew having Callicles be more specific about what he
means by the stronger, since it is upon this that his view of justice rests. Callicles agrees
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that the stronger is the same as the superior and the mightier (488c-d). But this simple
definition soon shows that the many are much stronger than the one, making the
oppression of the singular strong man just by nature as well. Callicles responds angrily,
as he will at most times, and accuses Socrates of more of the same, word-catching, and
being ironical (489d). Socrates meets his anger with a demanding reply: tell me what you
mean by the superior! Like his predecessors praising rhetoric before him, he can offer
only a praise of the superior, calling the better men superior (489e). The philosopher
helps him along and asks whether by the better he means the intelligent, to which the
young politician emphatically gives his support. It is this man who is deserving of rule
and having more.
Then comes an important dramatic directional by Socrates: “Stop right there”
(490b). He knows that Callicles is getting closer to facing his false opinion and wants to
make sure he stays on track. He then goes about giving many examples of how having
more looks ridiculous, such as a shoe maker wearing exceptionally large shoes, or a tailor
with a huge coat (490b-491a). He is trying to get Callicles to understand what Callicles
means by having more, and what promise justice gives, if any, as to why the superior
deserve more. Socrates will not relent. He has to have Callicles voice his ideas himself
if self-refutation is to take place.
Out of frustration Callicles responds, but only gives a half answer. He
reemphasizes that the intelligent in regard to the affairs of the city should rule, and they
should be courageous as well (491a-b). Socrates chides him for his inconsistency.
Angered by the argument Callicles reasserts his definition strongly, concluding that these
superior, intelligent, courageous do indeed deserve more. Since Callicles answers neither
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why nor of what the superior deserve, Socrates opts for a change in tactic and asks if
these rulers deserve more “in relation to themselves” (491d). In other words, do they rule
themselves? Are they moderate? His response is that no man “should impose a master
on themselves” and launches into the hedonist argument by praising “luxury,
intemperance, and freedom- this is virtue and happiness” (492b-c).
There is an error in assuming from this argument that Callicles’s defining
characteristic is pleasure-seeking. This is far from the truth. He takes up the hedonist
argument thinking it will support what he really believes; it is not completely sincere and
it is not the point he is trying to make. From what we’ve seen of Callicles so far, he has
an attachment to strength, intelligence, courage, and freedom. This is the essential
package of Greek manliness in fifth century Greece, and perhaps along the lines of
Machiavelli’s’ virtu (Klosko 1984, 127). These standards are why he does not slip into a
nihilist argument, which is impenetrable to attack, “and in the existence of these
standards, on which they and the ordinary man are agreed, lies the hope of a solution”
(Adkins 1960, 240).
Callicles wants to prove to himself that he is a man; the hedonist argument is
simply a position he is forced into supporting because moderation does not fit his image
of manliness. As his reasoning goes, when the weak turned justice into a conventional
virtue, in order to tie down the strong, so too did they conventionalize moderation,
making it shameful for the superior, though naturally deserving, to take more than any
other.
His stance on moderation may stem from a disappointment in Socratic virtue. Per
the axiom, all human beings have a notion of and believe in the moral goodness of virtue
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in the soul. But like Polus, Callicles could not but see the tendency of the just man to
suffer injustice. How does this suffering align with the other virtues he holds dear?
Rather than pursuing the necessary philosophic inquiry to reconcile this disparity
Callicles simply forfeits justice, twisting it into his perverted sense of natural justice.
This is the easy way out, the cowardly and unmanly way out, “for to admit that one is
concerned with virtue, and that one has a deep desire to see virtue triumph, is to open
oneself to sorrow and anger when virtue fails or is defeated by vice” (Stauffer 2006, 117).
Socrates is content with Callicles’s response, seeing in it an opportunity to
address the main concern. He states that Callicles is finally stating what many think but
are unwilling to say (492d). He encourages Callicles not to slacken. Socrates then
proceeds with a couple of fables. Subtly, Socrates is trying to persuade Callicles to
change his position, but he will really offer nothing through the fables to replace his false
opinions. Socrates’s point will be to make Callicles’s stance on hedonism look
ridiculous; he will be speaking rhetorically in hopes of inspiring Callicles to refute his
own ideas.
Relying upon a myth that uses a clever pun in original Greek, Socrates relates
how the persuadable part or the soul is like a jar, and the unintelligent man’s jar is
perforated (493b). Also, in order to fill their jars, the unintelligent are forced to use a
sieve. Again, this myth offers nothing constructive for Callicles. It is a mental image to
get him to think about an order in his soul, about a hierarchy to the parts of his soul and
which ones are persuadable. A second myth reinforces this- the moderate man is like
someone with several jars who had great difficulty filling them, but finally rests after
doing so, whereas the immoderate man has leaky jars and is constantly filling them. So
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which life is happier? For Callicles, happiness is in the flowing. It is having all the
desires and “in keeping as much as possible flowing in” (494b).
What Callicles really wants to show by this is the power and courage that are
needed to produce such an inflow. His focus is not on being pleased and satisfied. The
emphasis on the inflow is a stress on activity. Callicles holds that a political life is more
active than a philosophic life, which is why he and his friends decided to leave it behind
(487c-d). He takes up the hedonist argument because he thinks he is stressing these
factors.
Again Socrates congratulates him on this fine definition, because it is leading
along to the point he desires to make. Callicles needs to fully understand what his false
opinion is if he is ever to overcome it. If filling desires is happiness then a man who gets
pleasure from itching will be happy if he could itch for the rest of his life. While the man
with a simple itch on his head is conceded to by Callicles in order to keep the argument
consistent, he cannot concede to the shame in admitting that the culmination of this
example, the catamite, is a happy existence (494c-e).
Perhaps a little agitated about the catamite jab, Callicles puts a more intense
scrutiny to his words. Taking advantage of this Socrates begins a new line of questioning
and draws careful consideration to his next tenet. He warns Callicles to answer carefully
after consideration: can the good and the bad exist at the same time? Callicles gives his
emphatic approval that they cannot. When this proves that the good and the pleasant are
not the same, Callicles erupts and accuses Socrates of sophism (497a). Perhaps the
argument would have ended here with Callicles quitting from the conversation, but
Gorgias intercedes, making known his desire to bring the discussion to an end.
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Why does Gorgias intercede? Does he see what Socrates is getting at and does he
understand what Socrates is trying to define as rhetoric? When Callicles asks why he
should continue the rhetor responds that it is not Callicles’s honor at stake (497b). What
does he mean by this? Is it, rather, Gorgias’s honor at stake? Does a refutation of
Callicles, as well as Polus (both being products of the man), really amount to a defeat of
Gorgias? To a degree yes, but what is interesting is that Gorgias is then encouraging his
own defeat by desiring the conversation to continue. Alternatively, it could be that the
many codlings by Socrates convinced the rhetor that what is at stake is the truth of the
argument, not verbal victory. Either way, Socrates has intrigued Gorgias, and perhaps
now, through the examples of Polus and Callicles, the rhetor is beginning to see the need
for an alliance of rhetoric and dialectic. Additionally, Gorgias admonishes Callicles to
submit to Socrates’s refutations, urging the young Athenian to submit to the just
punishment (497b).
The real point that Socrates was trying to make now comes through: the good is
not the same as the pleasant, but more importantly, this also means that neither is the bad
the same as the painful (497d). This is a key point in refuting Callicles’s false opinion
because if some painful things can be good then a just man suffering from an unjust act
can be good. This opens Callicles to an understanding of what good means and he is
finally forced to admit that some pleasures are bad, though he does so under the guise of
joking and attributing the saying to others. Socrates catches him on this, chides him for
his rhetoric, and forces him to take up the opinion as his own (499b-c). Without fully
owning up to these confessions Callicles will never be able to suffer the just penalty of
self-refutation.
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The fact that the good is the end goal, and not the path pursued, is reinforced.
This had been Callicles’s belief all along. The good is action and strength to procure that
action, particularly political action, and hedonism simply was a way of expressing that.
But it takes an artful man to know the good that is being sought. This brings Socrates to
hit on a key note that really opens up what the philosopher is driving at. The question
Callicles is really driving at is, as has been noted, is what way of life is best, politics or
philosophy. But Socrates notes that in order to answer this he needs to go back and
distinguish between “acting in politics in this way in which you now act in politics; or
this life in philosophy; and in what respect it can be that this life differs from that one”
(500c).
While it is clear that the way that Callicles currently acts in politics is differs
dramatically from the philosophic life, a more important question to ask is if and how
much a life practicing the true art of politics differs from a philosophic life. Kastley
suggests, “The confusion in which Socrates and Callicles place themselves begins by
their false assumption that the political and philosophical lives can be isolated from each
other. The choice that the dialogue must explore is whether one should lead a
philosophically criticized political existence” (1991, 105). It will be Socrates who, just a
little later on in the dialogue, will assert that he alone practices the “true political art”
(521d). The true political art is not practicing politics as Callicles understands it. A truly
political life has more in common with a philosophic life than has been previously
considered. As their discussion continues, and this confluence between the two lives
becomes clearer, Callicles will become more active in the dialogue, but will fall short of
being courageous enough to make a change that the argument upholds.
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Callicles notes that he does not understand what Socrates is getting at. Socrates
promises to speak more clearly, but will need to reiterate much of the argument,
establishing anew that a true art gives a reasoned account of the nature of the thing, and
that by lacking this flattery is merely a knack (501a-c). Callicles accedes to this only to
move the conversation along; he does not give it as his opinion. Socrates then lists
several practices that fit the definition of flattery: flute playing, choruses, tragedy, and
poetry (501d-502c). This last practice of poetry Socrates adds in particular for Gorgias as
a warning to the rhetor not to glory so much in his renowned style and to focus on the
content and how it is taught, a lesson perhaps taken to heart by his witnessing the actions
and words of Polus and Callicles.
But now the conversation turns back to Callicles. These were the simple
questions, and now Socrates will try to make clear the distinction, if any, between the
political and philosophic life. While the above-mentioned practices of rhetoric were
directed to a very general audience, “both slave and free,” he now begins to ask about the
rhetoric directed only at the free Athenian people. Is the rhetoric addressed to them
aimed at making citizens better or at gratifying them as children (502e-503a)? This is
difficult to answer, to which Callicles responds that some speak toward the best and some
speak to gratify. “That is enough” responds Socrates, showing that Callicles is
proceeding in Socrates’s desired direction (503a). It shows that perhaps Callicles wants
to look toward more than just pandering to the demos in his political career, but has at
heart the best interests of the polis.
What Socrates says next is crucial: “for if this thing too is double, one part of it
anyway would be flattery and shameful popular speaking, and the other would be noble:
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making preparations for the citizens’ souls to be as good as possible and fighting to say
the best things, whether they will be more pleasant or more unpleasant to the hearers”
(503a).
What does he mean by “this thing” and how is it “double”? It obviously points toward
rhetoric, and this is the first mention of the practice having a noble aspect.
While the argument demonstrates a dual nature to rhetoric, Socrates can think of
no statesman that has used this form of rhetoric. Callicles suggests several examples
from the past: Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades, and Pericles (503c). But with virtue
defined as making men better, Socrates cannot admit to these men accomplishing that.
He begins an examination of this “in a calm manner” (503e). He desires the conversation
to be calm because he knows where the conversation is headed, which will inspire the
most bitter part of the dialogue, for it will challenge Callicles at his core.
The philosopher does not come right out and state why these men were not good
politicians. He first builds a foundation for all craftsmen, which includes those of the
political art, stating that their work is not random, but in order, “working to have a certain
form” (503e). An understanding of the form of an art requires a certain arrangement, a
harmony with the whole. Callicles’s answers show that he is only giving
acknowledgment to continue the argument, making it difficult to discern how much he
actually agrees to. The proper order and harmony of the body is called health, and that of
the soul is called “the lawful” and “law,” which are “justice” and “moderation” (504d).
These things are the focus of the noble rhetor, “always directing his mind toward how he
may get justice to come into being in the citizens’ souls and injustice to be removed,
moderation to arise within and intemperance to be removed, the rest of virtue to arise
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within and badness to depart” (504d-e). Just as a doctor does not allow a sick patient to
indulge in pleasant but harmful food and drink, so too must the artful and good rhetor
keep the base soul from indulging in harmful desires (505b).
The conclusion is painful for Callicles, for it follows that punishment is thus
better than intemperance. It becomes clear that Socrates is trying to administer the just
punishment to Callicles, as he had to Polus, when he states, somewhat sarcastically, “this
man here does not abide being benefited and suffering for himself this thing that the
arrangement is about, being punished” (505c). Callicles has suffered enough, quits the
argument, and suggests that Socrates complete it himself. Socrates is not reluctant to do
so. He again reiterates what was stated in the beginning, that the worst evil is to have
“falsehoods as regards the things we are talking about” (505e). But unlike this
admonition that was given to Gorgias in the beginning, Socrates here adds a correlation
to being a lover of victory over these falsehoods, “for it is a common good for all that it
becomes manifest” (506a, emphasis added). Though not completely revealed yet, here is
a major unveiling of the true art of politics.
Politics as used by Socrates until this point in the dialogue had always been used
as a personal, individual thing. Politics is the business of the soul, the individual soul; all
references to the many involved rhetoric, the phantom justice. How then does politics
apply to the “common good,” to the many? It must be remembered that the references to
the many were that rhetoric could only inspire belief in, not teach, the many at one time.
That politics is an individual thing, and that Socrates works on a one-on-one basis, does
not negate that what he teaches is only for the few. Rather, as noted in the Apology, he
spent his days speaking with all manners of peoples, urging them to care more for their
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soul than for their bodies, urging them to truly care for politics. That he refrained from
entering the public arena, but held these conversations privately, seems to make him
apolitical, but as more is unveiled and the true art of politics becomes clear; it will be
clear how political he actually was.
The conversation may have ended before any of this was revealed though.
Callicles’s quitting the conversation prompts an offer from Socrates to offer to drop the
whole thing and bid it farewell. But Gorgias offers his last comment, expressing his
desire to hear the remaining things, even if that means that Socrates carry on the
conversation with himself. Callicles, perhaps out of shame, concedes and asks that
Socrates finish the conversation (506b-c).
To put the head on the argument first requires a recitation of all the points settled
upon. The three Stephanus pages from 506c-509c provide a succinct and direct
reiteration of the important points established in dialogue: the pleasant and the good are
not the same; the pleasant is done for the sake of the good; all good things are good by
the presence of virtue; virtue is a certain art and orderliness; thus each thing’s order
makes it good, the soul has an order which includes moderation; the moderate man does
fitting things both toward gods and men; the fitting things toward the god is piety and
towards man is justice; he who does just things is just; being just requires courage; acting
well and nobly while being just, courageous, and pious will be a blessed and happy life.
This leads Socrates to answer Callicles’s indirect question that the best life to live
is “straining to direct all one’s and the city’s things toward this, that justice and
moderation will be present for him who is to be blessed” (507d-e). When Socrates first
mentioned the greatest evil it was prefaced by stating the greatest good is to be “released
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from the greatest evil” (458a). How great is the good to release one’s self from the
greatest evil, but how much better is it to increase that number and release others as well!
Socrates continues, “thus must one act, not allowing desires to be intemperate and
striving to satiate them…For such a one would be dear friend neither to another human
being nor to god; for he would be unable to share in common, and he in whom there is no
community would have no friendship” (507e, emphasis added).
This emphasis on friendship at the end is an important aspect to refuting Callicles.
Leading up to this statement Socrates changed his mode of recognizing dissonance from
swearing “by the dog” to using the oath “by the god of friendship” (500b-c). Callicles
wants a political life, but he also wants something out of the political life for himself
personally: a reputation of manliness. To Callicles, serving the polis is perfectly
confluent with his desire; they are one and the same. But as Socrates is unveiling what
the true art of politics is, he is trying to get Callicles to consider if he is not mistaken
about the point of politics.
The whole kosmos-gods, heaven, earth, and human beings-is held together by
“community, friendship, orderliness, moderation, and justice” (508a). These things
follow a sort of “geometrical equality” resting upon the premise that the happy are happy
by virtue. Additionally, “he who is to be correctly rhetorical must therefore be just and a
knower of just things” (508c). If there was any ambivalence about this point in the
Gorgias section, that the man who has learned justice is in fact just, Socrates clears it up
here: a man must be a knower of just things and exercise his just knowledge
appropriately. This has been an underlying theme about rhetoric: that it is used
inappropriately. It is a key factor that Gorgias himself struggled with. Socrates was not
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ignorant about this aspect applying to Gorgias. It was not a necessary point to drive
home to Gorgias because of his lack of desire for power. But for the aspiring politician,
it is a strong point that needs to be driven home. Rhetoric is to refute the false opinions
of our friends and family to the end that they become just. Moreover, rhetoric is most
useful when the one that we attempt to persuade is ourselves.
Now Socrates will begin the strong arguments in attempting to persuade Callicles
to choose the just life over what his false opinions are pulling him toward. Callicles’s socalled “greatest dangers” (such as being beaten, robbed and killed) are petty concerns.
Whereas it might take courage and manliness to stand up to those who would commit
such injustices, it is real courage to stand up to the injustice we personally are tempted to
commit. The arguments Socrates has laid down are bound with iron and adamantine.
Anything less is ridiculous and no fine thing (509a).
This statement has caused some to pause. Stauffer notes that nowhere does
Socrates state that these arguments are true, simply that anyone who argues against them
becomes ridiculous (2006, 137). There have been several logical flaws noted already.
Does Socrates not believe in his own stance and position? The fact that Socrates does not
state that they are the absolute truth has two purposes. First, it follows along with his
professed, albeit probably ironic, ignorance (509e). Second, it is an invitation to discuss
these things more. Socrates knows that he has been speaking rhetorically and that he has
not given a fully reasoned account of what he argues. That is one of his main purposes.
But although he cannot call it knowledge because he does not possess a full accounting, it
does not necessarily follow that he does not believe it (Cornford 1927, 310). A
dialectical conversation might be what is needed to uncover the absolute truth of these
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things, but as the dialogue has shown this is an impossibility with the present company in
their present condition, false opinions and everything. Perhaps at some later point
Callicles might reflect upon these things, discover that they are not tied down with iron
and adamantine, and seek out Socrates to do so.
But more convincing than these two suggestions is to understand what Socrates
means by “ridiculous” here. The same word is used again in the following sentence,
claiming that the human being who commits injustice and escapes the just punishment is
a human being “ridiculous in truth” (509b). What makes the person ridiculous is not so
much the inconsistency of the logic in their argument as much as the inconsistency in
their soul. Unfortunately, this latter aspect is impossible to see physically and difficult to
discern otherwise. Again, this is the greatest evil, to have these false opinions and to
suffer such an inconsistency of soul. On the flip side, if this is the greatest evil, the
greatest benefit is to be able to relieve this inconsistency. The power to do this is the will
to power that Callicles falsely aligns with his twisted understanding of justice, and it
again points toward Socrates’s desire to help the community.
Now Socrates opens up more, and the dialogue takes a dialectical turn. He asks if
there is a way to avoid suffering injustice (509d). Is it sufficient simply to not want to
suffer it, or is there a need to prepare some kind of power? Callicles can agree with this
easily enough: a prepared power is necessary. This might even have intrigued Callicles a
bit to bring him a little more into the conversation, but it will not last long. Socrates then
follows up this question by asking whether a certain power or art is necessary to protect
us from committing injustice. Callicles is slow to answer, and when finally forced, he
explodes and answers only to please Socrates so that he can continue. This is not his
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concern. Socrates may have touched him enough to stroke his care for justice, but his
main concern is that it still seems powerless. There is no guarantee from injustice by
acting justly.
So Socrates returns to the subject that interests the young politician. What is the
power to avoid suffering injustice? Is it anything less than actually ruling in the city or
being a comrade to the regime in power (510a)? Callicles is more than ready to praise
this; it is the exact opinion that his own thoughts had concluded upon and led him to a
political life. But in order to do this an assimilation needs to take place. The strength of
a friendship is correlated with the degree of likeness between the friends. So the direct
answer to this inquiry is that, from youth, the man who wants great power in the city in
order to avoid suffering injustice must “accustom himself to rejoice and to be distressed
at the same things as the master, and to make preparations so as to be as much as possible
like that man” (510d). In other words, he must learn to flatter. He must disrupt any
harmony in his soul to make it a rag-tag collection of thoughts , beliefs, and desires in
order to appear alike to anyone in power.
The consequence of this is easy to see. Protection from suffering injustice may be
achieved, but protection from committing injustice will be diminished if not destroyed
(510e). Worse yet, not only will this man commit injustice, but he will also escape the
just penalty. Getting away with injustice only works to cement the false opinion that
injustice is good, causing this man to fall victim to the worst degree of the greatest evil.
Callicles, however, makes a pertinent point: this man commands great power. Similar to
the argument in the Polus section, the tyrant in the city does indeed have power.
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Socrates then offers the answer that Callicles was too cowardly to pursue
previously, that led him to his twisted sense of justice. If this tyrant should kill, it would
be a base man killing a noble and good one. The outburst that follows reveals how
Callicles truly feels about justice and these matters; “is not this exactly the infuriating
thing?” (511b). Callicles is not in the pursuit of power simply; he has no desire to kill at
whim. Why else would he be infuriated at the suffering of the just man? Hasn’t his
argument promoted it, even aligned it with natural justice? His words have, yes, but his
words did not relay his true intent. As has been noted, Callicles uses the examples of the
hedonist, and now the tyrant, in order to exemplify certain characteristics: manliness,
courage, intelligence, or in a word, the good. Callicles believes, even desires, that the
moral plane Socrates puts justice and these things upon is correct, but there is a big
problem in the way that keeps him from accepting it: the just man often suffers. There is
no guarantee from injustice by acting justly. It infuriates him enough that he no longer
has the patience to think about the matter any more, and he simply throws up his hands
and submits to a more cynical paradigm: natural justice is the rule of the stronger, and it
is manly, courageous, and intelligent to pursue this.
Socrates sets about correcting him on his false opinions on all these virtues. The
unjust treatment of the just is not among the greatest dangers to the intelligent man
(511b). Intelligence was the first characteristic that Callicles firmly laid down as his
definition for the superior, it is fitting that Socrates follow the path that has already
established. The intelligent man realizes that the purpose is not to life as long as possible,
but to live well (513a). Examples holding to long life are easily seen as ridiculous.
Swimming is an art that can be life saving, as navigation and engineering can be. Yet
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these professions are not held in so high esteem as a life of politics. What makes the
practice of being able to speak in a law court, to the saving one’s life from execution, any
different from practicing one of these arts? There is a difference between these arts that
makes politics nobler than the rest, but it is not in the ability to save lives.
The second aspect of the superior that Callicles praised was courage. Perhaps
Callicles holds to this virtue most strongly as he sees it as the gateway to all others. It is
courage that presents a strong sense of manliness; it is the quintessential element of a
man of all ages. Courage will give him the strength to take the first step to break the
chains of convention and rise to the top of the political spectrum. But perhaps he holds to
it so tightly because it is what he lacks most. Socrates confronts it face on to see if it will
really yield what Callicles expects it to. The philosopher begins with a warning, claiming
that Callicles may achieve great power in the city but at the cost of what he holds most
dear (513b). Callicles may still have a hope that if he can just pretend to be like the
existing regime that once he has power he can return to his desire for true justice and do
good. Socrates says don’t kid yourself. The cost of obtaining such power will not be in
merely pretending to be like the regime, but in actually becoming like them. It will cost
Callicles his attachment to justice and to the good.
Is this a condemnation of politics as a whole? Is it really impossible to obtain
power in a city without sacrificing justice, moderation, and the rest of virtue? This is not
what Socrates is suggesting; this is what Callicles thinks, this is the path that he is on.
His considerations on how to obtain power and to hold to virtue left him abandoning
justice and the lot. Socrates is about to offer a way to obtain political power, though it
will be a new concept of politics Callicles has not considered before.

68

Callicles recognizes the truth in this statement, but he cannot bring himself fully
to commit to what Socrates is suggesting: “In some way, I don’t know what, what you
say seems good to me, Socrates; but I suffer the experience of the many- I am not
altogether persuaded by you” (513c). Socrates knows the cause of this; he has
experienced it before in others he has talked with. It is the love of the people, and it
opposes Socrates. The word love here is eros, whereas the word elsewhere used in the
dialogue was derived from philia. The difference between the two is important in
understanding Plato. It is an essential attachment in order to obtain any goodness.
But what exactly is the attachment that Callicles has with the demos? He speaks
poorly of them at the onset of his discussion with Socrates, but he also praises previous
politicians who were good servants of them?

Ultimately it seems he cares little for

them, as one of his last statements will reveal. “But what do you say about human beings
who are worth nothing?” asks Callicles (520a). Or is Callicles in love with them because
they promise him the political power he craves? They are the means to his end.
But perhaps Callicles hasn’t thought it through completely. He feels a desire, he
sees a personal benefit, but just like the question about whether a prepared power is
necessary to avoid suffering injustice, is a simple desire to have political power enough to
seek it, or is a prepared power necessary? This is what Socrates suggests: there is a need
for preparation, and a power that will come from that preparation. Just as the first
mention of politics revealed a double nature, something that looks toward pleasure and
something that looks toward the best, so, too, is it now. Actions for political affairs need
to look toward what is best by nature.
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Now supposing some political action at hand was the need to build something,
what would be the necessary steps to have this done? The decision to make the building
would include finding someone who had the necessary knowledge and knowing their
background as shown by their education and experience. It would be thoughtless to give
someone such a task with no proof (or condemning proof) of their stated ability (or
inability) (514a).
Similarly, the same must be asked of Callicles before he enters public life, “is
there someone who was base before-unjust, intemperate, and foolish-and has become
noble and good because of Callicles” (515a). This is a fair question to ask anyone who
desires to enter politics. He asks only to truly understand “what in the world is the way
you think you ought to act in politics?” (515b). To this Callicles replies, “you are a lover
of victory” (515b). This answer is telling, and it can mean a few things. I do not believe
that it is simply Callicles shutting down more. The last time the phrase “lover of victory”
was mentioned was in relation to being a lover of victory in revealing the falsehood of the
virtues being discussed. Is this an admission that Socrates has revealed the false opinion
at the core of Callicles?
This should be looked at more closely. Firstly, is it unfair to judge someone who
wants to enter politics, but has no previous political experience, on the merits of whom
they have made better citizens? Presumably, this is something that can be done only in
office, and the lack of not being in office shouldn’t count against the aspiring politician.
But Socrates is changing the way we look at politics. After all, it is foremost an
individual art. Callicles should at least have the claim that he has made himself better,
and this is the face he puts on in trying to be courageous and manly. But this
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conversation with Socrates has revealed how cowardly and womanly he is, causing him
to vocalize this admission of victory to Socrates.
At the same time, this is not a willful admission, and it is not a happy admission.
Callicles is wounded by having to say it, and his tone is angry and bitter. Socrates
matches the anger and gives his harsh critique of the Athenian leaders Callicles had
praised (515d-517a). As the dialogue reaches an apex of bitterness here, it should be
noted that the intense bitterness is not a sign of anger, but a genuine concern for the well
being of Callicles (Michelini 1988, 57). This attack does two things: it shows Callicles
that even a life in politics, as much assimilated to the regime as possible, or even ruling
the regime, does not turn out to be a guarantee against suffering injustice. The proof
previously given of the prepared power to avoid suffering injustice has famous historical
contradictions, being the same leaders that Callicles looks up to.
Socrates is unfair in his critique of the Athenian leaders. Or rather, he is using the
rhetorical technique of the bogey man, much as Polus had tried to do with Socrates, by
showing Callicles the lack of guarantee against injustice while serving politically.
Socrates cites Pericles for making the Athenians lazy, but calls him wise and the most
perfect rhetor in the Protagoras and the Phaedrus, respectively (Nichols, 1998, 117). He
mentions Cimon’s ostracism, but fails to mention his recall.
It all becomes clear after Callicles interjects that none of the politicians today
have accomplished what they did. Here it comes to light that Socrates does not blame
them, but actually considers them skilled in their service (517b). They were good at
providing for the desires of the Athenians, but they were not good at leading those
desires, ergo they were bad leaders. It becomes clear to Socrates why Callicles argues as
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he does; there is a miscommunication between them. Callicles does not understand the
Divided Oblong. As Socrates notes, “you have many times agreed and understood that
this occupation concerned both with the body and with the soul is indeed a certain double
one” (517e). Previously when Socrates referred to something being double it was that it
had an aspect that looked toward the best and an aspect that looked toward pleasure.
That is not the case here. The use of double refers on one side to the body and on the
other to the soul. This is how the Divided Oblong was introduced. But Socrates here is
referring to a single occupation as being double, whereas at the introduction of the
Divided Oblong there were two distinct businesses, the unnamed business of the body
and politics for the soul. Could it be that the unnamed business of the body is also
politics, making it a double art of the singular occupation being referred to here, of both
body and soul?
If this is true, how does this affect the argument? It sets the background for the
true art of politics and it will make Callicles confront what he really wants to accomplish
and what he wants personally out of a political life. By purposely omitting the name of
the body of business as politics at the beginning Socrates was able to keep Polus focused
on how rhetoric relates to justice. It was noted in the Polus chapter how at several
junctions the discussion could have led to a further inquiry of justice, and hence the true
art of politics, but Socrates held back because it was not important for Polus. Had he
given the double nature of politics at the beginning it would have diminished the effect
that flattery plays as the doubling role the true arts. Now Socrates reveals that he has
been concealing some things, “on purpose…so that you may thoroughly understand more
easily” (517d).
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Referring to the two-fold division of gymnastic and medicine in the business of
the body, it comes to light that other arts, such as “retailer or importer or
craftsman…baker, cook, weaver, cobbler, and leather dresser,” that are in the service of
the body, and often confused as the “caretakers of the body” (517e). Why these practices
get confused for true arts refers back to the Polus section, which proved that all our
actions are for some good. These practices supply the body with things necessary to
make it good, but the tendency is that the good becomes defined by the practice of
supplying these things rather than their effect on the body. Their activity becomes
political in that they rank their arts of supplying to one another not in relation to the value
supplied, but by the supplying itself. This is not an intentional corruption of the true art
of politics; rather, these caretakers of the body engage in political activity in good faith,
but through ignorance misplace the focus (Kastely 1991, 103-104).
The art of the body is political because, just like the soul, it requires
understanding what is best and then regulating behavior to stay in accordance with that.
But when politicians become more concerned with the supplying of the needs of the body
than with the good that come from those supplies, the regulatory aspect also shifts from
making the body better to perfecting the process of supplying. Thus things like the
regulation of commerce become the focus of politics.
Even though during the argument Callicles agrees to the definition of politics as
looking toward the best, he constantly falls back to this procedural politics. When
presented with the choice of either practicing true politics or this procedural one Callicles
recommends the latter, urging Socrates to choose the same (521b). The only way
Callicles can make sense of what Socrates is saying is if the philosopher does not really
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understand what politics is really about. He retreats to his argument that anyone doing
anything other than a focus on this procedural politics will suffer the worst dangers, and
accuses Socrates of not seeing this because he “dwells out of the way” (521c).
This accusation deserves reflection. Is Socrates really just out of touch, unable to
realize the impracticality or impossibility of his idealistic view of politics? Even Socrates
admits that there has never been a practitioner of true rhetoric, nor does he think much of
the demos as to hope they would all be able to look toward the best instead of seek after
pleasure and folly. But if Socrates “dwells out of the way,” it is because he has left the
cave and ascended the heights of philosophy (Republic VII).
The Calliclean charge accused philosophers of being out of touch with the city.
They know neither the laws nor the customs, and are unable to associate with others.
While it might be easy to conjure up an image of a philosopher that meets this
description, it portrays nothing of Socrates. He perhaps knows the law of Athens better
than Callicles; he participated in festivals and parties, and was constantly in the agora
speaking with many diverse people. Additionally, Socrates also portrays the manly
characteristics that Callicles desires of courage, strength, and intelligence as attested to by
Alcibiades’s speech in the Symposium (219-222).
Socrates is fully aware of the way things “are” and the way they “really are,”
which includes being aware of the consequences, and dangers, his lifestyle is threatened
with. Thus he boldly proclaims, “I put my hand to the true political art and I alone of
men today practice politics” (521d). What makes it the true political art is not that he
actually improves souls of others, but by “testing them, testing their beliefs, he improves
their souls by removing the chief source of their souls’ ugliness —their belief that they
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are already beautiful, i.e., already know what values they should pursue” (Labarge 2005,
32). He fully expects to be brought to court and tried as a doctor before a jury of
children, being prosecuted by a pastry chef. His only defense will be, “I did all these
things, boys, in the interest of health” (522a). This is a simple metaphor, but not an
inaccurate one, of his actual defense in the Apology.
This is courage. Socrates represents everything Callicles wants: belief in virtue
and justice, courage to stand up for it, and a reputation of manliness and intelligence.
True courage is not flinching from the appropriate way to act, whether it be to charge into
battle or to flee injustice. Still unconvinced, the last option is for Socrates to use another
rhetorical technique, referring again to the use of bogey men, and tell a myth (though he
considers it a reasoned account) of the afterlife and the punishment/rewards of injustice
and justice. A close look at the myth, however, scares away the bogey man and turns it
into a myth of optimism in that “being good will benefit you…and justice really is the
best” (Annas 1982, 125).
In conclusion, Callicles cannot reconcile his wish to be just with how the just
often suffer at the hands of the unjust. He therefore abandons Socratic virtue to assume
the belief of his twisted natural justice, which he believes will allow him to earn the
reputation of manliness. Socrates attempts to refute both Callicles’s false opinion about
justice as well as his expectations from politics. To gain the reputation that he desires
will cost him what is most dear to him: his buried belief in virtue. The true art of politics
is to always look toward the best, encourage others to do so, and not flinch from acting
accordingly.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The interweaving of rhetoric, the greatest evil, and the true art of politics creates
the unity of the dialogue. The relationship between these three topics is revealed through
a reading with careful attention paid to the drama of the dialogue. Drama is character
driven. It is understanding a character: what he believes, what he desires, and why he
acts as he does. The most common aspects that reveal character are dramatic blanks in
the dialogue, meaning Plato has not explicitly given direction about tone, motion,
emphasis, or other actions that are revealing. But there are enough clues throughout to
provide a good idea of how the participants in the dialogue should respond.
Rhetoric is the phantom part of politics, corresponding to justice, because it
creates a false opinion about what is best. It gives no reasoned account as to why
anything is best, but mostly relies on persuasive power of pleasure and folly to mask
having a care for this knowledge. This is the nature of rhetoric when it is taught as a
means to obtain power. Undoubtedly rhetoric has an amazing power to move, motivate,
and persuade any number of people to do or believe a number of things. But to mistake
this power as the good in and of itself is when error begins.
Noble rhetoric is subservient to a true art. The example of the rhetor and the
doctor shows its value and utility to medicine, but perhaps its best use is in the political
art, particularly to persuade about the true nature of justice. It does not flatter, saying
only the pleasing things to the audience, but “fights to say the best things, whether they
will be more pleasant or unpleasant to the hearers” (503b). Often this means noble
rhetoric is refutative, aiming to persuade those with a false opinion of justice to refute
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their own opinions by coming to a realization of their own falsity or ignorance. This selfrefutation inspires Socratic ignorance, the knowledge of not having knowledge, which
hopefully leads toward philosophy, which is the true cure for a false opinion.
Having a false opinion, particularly of justice, is the greatest evil for a human
being to suffer. This is not to diminish the great evil in actually committing injustice, but
it is from thoughts that actions flow. A just punishment of a fine or a prison sentence
may correct the damage of an injustice committed, but is no guarantee of correcting the
damage to the soul, which is a better guarantee against future injustices. A false opinion,
rather than an unjust act, is the true disease and it requires the just punishment of selfrefutation.
Toward the end of the dialogue, Socrates asks Callicles if there is some kind of
prepared power to avoid both doing injustice and suffering injustice (509d-e). The power
to avoid suffering is in becoming a friend of the state, assimilating as much as possible to
the character and nature of the regime. This is what most people consider to be politics.
But this power does nothing to diminish, but rather enhances, the likelihood of
committing injustice. What the dialogue points toward as the power to avoid committing
injustice is the true art of politics.
The true art of politics is two-fold: it is recognizing the nature of what is best, for
both body and soul, and regulating behavior to abide by the precepts of the best. Justice
is the principle that guides what is best for the soul and medicine for the body. Through
the legislative art for the soul and gymnastic for the body the proper rules, regulations,
and laws are made to align with what justice and medicine dictate, being enforced by
self-discipline and moderation.
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The true art of politics is an individual matter. But this does not negate the
importance of politics on a larger scale, for the community. While politics, like rhetoric,
has an offer of power to its pursuers, those desiring this power need first to come to terms
with what they really want from the practice of politics. What holds human beings
together is “community, friendship, orderliness, and justness” (508a). This seems to be
the same principle that justice follows to create a structure of good within the soul,
outlining what is best. Politics on a larger scale should thus only be entered upon when
the things that hold human beings together are correctly ordered within the self. The
politician needs to offer himself as an example of someone he has made better through
practicing the true art of politics, qualifying him to deem what is best and what laws will
uphold that on a larger scale.
Each of the characters in the dialogue has his own unique false opinion of justice.
Gorgias is largely ambivalent to justice, recognizing the power of logos to create a
relativistic, situational nature of things. His ambivalence toward justice, however, is an
endorsement of injustice by default, for when pressed to describe the good of rhetoric he
is too ashamed to show that most uses are examples of injustice and resorts rather to a
praise of the art for simply being powerful. This makes Gorgias question his own
indifference toward justice and appear to be convinced that a teacher of rhetoric must in
truth be a knower of the just and unjust, as well as a doer of justice.
Socrates’s initial desire to speak with Gorgias was two-fold. He recognized
something different about the man from the rest of the similar profession of sophistry,
which was his denial to teach virtue. As the self-refutation from the dialogue with
Socrates takes hold, Gorgias begins to realize the error in this stance. As Socrates sees
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the greatest good as being released from false opinions by “straining to direct all one’s
own and the city’s things toward this, that justice and moderation will be present,” he
would welcome the help of Gorgias in his ability to speak to the many (507d-e). Rhetoric
would create a fraternity to the true art of dialectic in an effort to educate the citizens
about the best things (Weiss 2003, 195).
Polus interrupts to save the reputation of rhetoric. As a student and aspiring
professional, Polus’s reputation is tied to that of rhetoric, a reputation he will fight to
uphold at the expense of discrediting his teacher of the value of his education and worth
of his knowledge. Like his teacher he has a certain ambivalence toward justice, but his
greater desire for power and reputation amplifies his default endorsement of injustice.
Perhaps recognizing this to a degree he tries to cover this by admitting that justice may be
good, but injustice is merely shameful, not bad. His own lack in believing this, and in
part due to a lack of intelligence, causes him to be refuted, but the self-refutation is not
fully persuasive.
Socrates tries to show Polus that he is mistaken in the value he puts in rhetoric.
The philosopher bests the young rhetor’s rhetorical techniques by turning Polus into his
own witness. This refutation was meant to show Polus that rhetoric’s power is not as
great as he makes it out to be, and that the humiliation for a lack of reputation is not a
harmful thing. The refutation was a just penalty to persuade Polus to question his own
views and investigate these things further. The colt proves quite cowardly and instead of
proceeding forward falls back into the protection and comfort of his false opinions as
soon as Callicles jumps on the scene.
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Callicles, perhaps once a student of philosophy but now an aspiring politician,
opens with a condemning charge against Socrates. In it, he upholds his natural view of
justice and the classical Greek sense of manliness over philosophy. He holds tightly to
the traits of manliness (intelligence, courage, strength) as they seem to him the only way
to effect any good in the polis. Virtue otherwise is powerless to stop injustice and thus
seems slavish. But he wants to do good, whether he truly loves the demos or not. His
attachment to manliness obligates him to take up the hedonist argument simply as a
demonstration of these characteristics rather than from a desire to please his appetites.
Where Socrates really refutes the young politician is in his assumptions about
politics. Callicles is forced to confront whether his political heroes were actually good or
not. In service to the city they excelled in cleverness and accomplished more than any
other statesman, but in actually leading and making the citizens better, they apparently
failed. Callicles should decide what is really more important: administrative service or
actual leadership. Additionally, he should provide proof of his ability to lead, meaning
he should master himself before he tries to master others.
Upon concluding the ending myth, Socrates reiterates that his participants should
be persuaded by the arguments of the dialogue, for they alone remain standing while all
else has been made to look ridiculous. They are currently all in a shameful position,
acting like youth in claiming that the greatest things, justice and the rest of virtue, all
change and never seem the same, to which he exclaims. “to such a degree of lack of
education have we come!” (527d-e). So many of the problems of the Gorgias seem to
point to just this, education. The greatest evil is cured by a type of education: a
realization of ignorance and an understanding of nature derived through philosophic
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inquiry. The true political art requires an education in justice. Perhaps the only true
prepared power to protect against injustice is just this: a proper education for oneself as
well as the community.
Leo Strauss noted that “the classical teaching cannot be immediately applicable to
modern society, but has to be made applicable to it, that is, must be modernized or
distorted” (1946, 333). How is the Gorgias to be viewed through a modern lens to be
made applicable today? How useful can Socrates’s rhetoric be today? Firstly, I don’t
agree that the dialogue is meant to be a condemnation of the Socratic method. Klosko
calls the failure of Socrates to truly persuade any of the discussants, to force them to
listen to a complete reasoned account of their false opinions, “the tragedy of philosophy”
(1983, 593). The importance of philosophy is not diminished by this fact, but the point
remains that philosophy is not for everyone. A Gorgianic/Socratic alliance is perhaps
needed now more than ever.
Bur rhetoric itself has also changed. Hamilton in the introduction to his
translation of the dialogue notes, “To us the ability to speak acceptably and convincingly
in public is a relatively trivial factor in the ordinary citizen's equipment for a successful
life; to the ambitious Athenian of the fifth and fourth centuries b.c. it was essential”
(1960, 7). Rhetoric today is more the stuff of reelection speeches and the bashing of
ideologues on blog posts, Twitter feeds, and cable news networks. The essential nature
of rhetorical speech has lost its value for common citizens.
Rhetoric in use today, similar to Gorgianic rhetoric, is not in line with noble
rhetoric. Bu the answer is not to simply add more rhetoric to the mix; it would be more
likely to be drowned out in what already pervades multi-media. The answer lies in the
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ending of the dialogue: education. For noble rhetoric to be self-refutative it needs to be
presented in a manner where the subject will be forced to make the correct conclusion of
his falsity. What better way to address these issues than to partake in some of the original
dialogues that addressed this issue. An emphasis on classical education is the best chance
to instill the critical thought necessary to truly answer the questions about what is best
and grant us the path to correct our false opinions along the way.
But if classical thought admits to only one good, one way that is best, does not
that do more to damage public discourse by creating intolerance? Socrates may be
adamant in his stance on the good, but he is closed off neither to differing ideas nor
people. His openness was a way to ensure that none of the good escaped him. Dialectic
is not a tactic to debase the other side and glorify one’s own position as best, but rather it
is “an idealized analogue of democratic debate” (Euben 1994, 222). There is a greater
sincerity in coming face to face with a conflicting view that may diminish and destroy
beliefs and opinions that are held dearly and deeply than in pandering to their untested
value in the name of toleration. There is nothing to fear in pursuing a philosophic
education and much to gain. If indeed the dialogue is a piece of propaganda for the
Academy then its persuasive point toward education has been acknowledged even today.
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